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ABSTRACT
First introduced in 1875, Blaine Amendments restrict private, parochial schools from
utilizing publicly acquired funds. While the federally proposed Blaine Amendment died on the
Senate floor, 37 states have adopted constitutional language that limits and/or bars religious
schools from receiving public funds. Fraught with bigotry and labeled as discriminatory, such
measures have not gone without challenge and the judicial system has delivered numerous
decisions on funding public and private schools. However, jurisprudence reveals significant
shifts in court decisions over time. Through analysis of Supreme Court cases from Everson v.
Board of Education (1947) to Espinoza v. Montana (2020), this work sought to explain the
historical relevance of Blaine Amendments, explore prominent caselaw specific to publicly
funding parochial schools, identify socio-political factors associated with changes in judicial
ideology since the late 19th century, and indicate potential consequences of eliminating Blaine
Amendments.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

United States Constitution
Amendment I
Research Problem
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution stands as a significant pillar of
democracy. Members of the judiciary are tasked with applying the First Amendment in a manner
that respects and protects the liberties it guarantees. The First Amendment draws litigation on a
wide variety of issues in education; perhaps none more volatile than tensions between
government and religious schools (McCarthy, 2009). Specifically, school funding has long been
an area of contentious debate. Conflicting political ideologies have polarized school funding
discourse at the local, state, and federal levels. Of the issues embedded within school funding,
allowing religious schools to receive public funds remains as a heavily controversial subject.
Strict separation between church and state was once a widely held precedent of the courts
but judicial interpretations have shifted over the past 70 years. Beginning with Everson v. Board
of Education (1947), under the leadership of Justice Black, the Court emphasized a “high and
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impregnable” wall of separation between church and state. More recently, under the leadership
of Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court of the United States has moved towards viewing the
exclusion of parochial schools from receiving public funds as discriminatory, “odious to our
Constitution” and in violation of the Free Exercise Clause (Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 2017).
Additionally, a study conducted by Epstein and Posner (2021), revealed “Plainly, the Roberts
Court has ruled in favor of religious organizations, including mainstream Christian
organizations, more frequently than its predecessors” (p. 18).
Established by The Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court of the United States is
relied upon to delineate legal matters of specific circumstance and fabricate a partition between
constitutional and unconstitutional acts. As we consider current issues in education funding, an
area receiving a considerable amount of attention calls to question the extent to which religious
schools may receive public aid. Generally speaking, education funding is regulated by laws and
policies at the federal and state levels. At the state level, 37 states have a Blaine Amendment, or
a state provision that prohibits religious schools from receiving public funds (Burke & Stepman,
2014). Of primary effect, Blaine Amendments have historically fortified a barrier between
church and state.
While similar to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment in that Blaine
Amendments seek to distance relationships between church and state, Alexander and Alexander
(2019) held that Blaine Amendments are “explicitly stronger” than language within the First
Amendment (p. 233). Many oppose legislation that actively prohibits religious education
institutions from accessing public funds, viewing such amendments as an unconstitutional
impediment to school choice (Burke & Stepman, 2014). While not addressing Blaine
Amendments specifically, former President Trump (2017), speaking at the Faith and Freedom
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Coalition, weighed in on religion and schools stating, “Schools should not be a place that drives
out faith and religion, but that should welcome faith and religion with wide, open, beautiful
arms… It is time to put a stop to the attacks on religion.” However, Trump does not stand alone
in this action as former George W. Bush articulated his intentions for an Office of Faith-Based
programs shortly after his inauguration (Feldman, 2002).
The idea of lessening restrictions on the separation between church and state is far from
widely accepted. It is also argued that eliminating Blaine Amendments will weaken the barrier
between church and state and allow for unconstitutional funding of religious schools (Alexander
& Alexander, 2019). Through analysis of historical documents and caselaw, it is clear the
judiciary has not championed one ideological lens for viewing cases pertaining to religion and
public schools.
Purpose of Study
This study examined the origin of Blaine Amendments, analyzed the factors contributing
to shifts in judicial interpretation of relinquishing public funds to religious schools and depicted
the impact that removing Blaine Amendments may have on education institutions. Table 1
depicts the research questions addressed.
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Table 1.1
Research Questions and Corresponding Research Methods
Research Questions
1. What social or political factors, if any, have contributed
to ideological shifts in the judiciary?

Research Methods
•

Document analysis

•

Legal research

•

Document analysis

•

Legal research

a. What trends, if any, can be found through
analysis of litigation in the area of religion and
public schools?
2. What are the consequences, if any, for education
institutions if Blaine Amendments are found to be
unconstitutional?

An overview of the Religion Clauses embedded within the First Amendment, and specific
cases, served as the genesis of this work. Following a look at the First Amendment is an
exploration of the history of Blaine Amendments. Trailing a historical overview is a summary of
pertinent caselaw, inclusive of an analysis of Trinity Lutheran v. Comer (2017) and Espinoza v.
Montana Department of Revenue (2020) which shed light on the Supreme Court of the United
States’ current interpretation of relinquishing public funds to parochial schools.
The literature reviewed can be classified into three categories: seminal works, recent articles,
and court cases. Seminal works were selected based upon their significant influence on the field
of church-state law. The category of recent articles is comprised of a variety of works put forth
by legal scholars and attorneys. Finally, much attention is given to caselaw determining the
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constitutionality of allocating public funds to religious institutions. Each of the three
aforementioned literature categories played a crucial role in addressing the research questions
outlined above.
Definition of Terms
Caselaw: law established by judicial decisions in cases (see https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/caselaw).
Parochial: of or relating to a church parish (see https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/parochial).
Religion: “a belief system that postulates the existence of an immortal afterlife”
(Diamond, 2013)
Socio-political: of, relating to, or involving a combination of social and political factors
(see https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/socio-political).
Funding: a sum of money or other resource whose principal interest is set apart for a
specific objective (see https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/funding).
Significance of Study
Each section of this work appears to support the claim that shifts in judicial ideology have
significantly impacted the Court’s interpretation of publicly funding religious schools. Emphasis
is placed on the role that strict separation between church and state has played throughout history
and the viewpoint that Blaine Amendments, although seemingly born of bigotry, attempt to
fortify a robust barrier between church and state (Duncan, 2003; Alexander & Alexander, 2019).
Thorough review and identification of trends in historic caselaw may indicate the direction of the
Court in future cases involving funding and religion and public schools. Pending judicial
interpretation, removal of constitutional language prohibiting religious institutions from
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acquiring public aid has led to a weakening or sheer abandonment of the barriers between church
and state. Furthermore, this study sought to identify consequences for education institutions due
to the deterioration of the barrier between church and state.
Overview of Research Study
Exploration of the aforementioned research questions was done through careful analysis
of documents and legal research methods. Review of Supreme Court caselaw highlighted shifts
in judicial ideology and provided data necessary to determine trends. Using Thro’s (1994) waves
of school finance litigation, this study identified trends in litigation and judicial ideology specific
to funding religious schools. An analysis of trends was used to predict the consequences of
removing Blaine language from state constitutions.
Researcher Positionality
The passion behind this inquiry is not so organic that it is free of assumptions. My lens
adopted for this research is influenced by my lived experiences and belief systems.
Professionally, I serve as an assistant principal at a public elementary school in Florida. Over the
span of nearly fourteen years, I have held many positions within the same public school system.
My personal experiences with school are also specific to the public school system. Although
nearly all of my personal and professional experiences were in public schools, I do not have an
aversion to religious education. For the purposes of this work, however, I interpret the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution to be a balance of strict separation and
accommodation between church and state. While the aim of this work was to remain neutral
throughout my inquiry, I understand that my experiences and beliefs surface during the course of
this study.
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Summary
Publicly funding America’s schools is a noteworthy topic generating much debate since
the founding of the Boston Latin School on April 23, 1635 (Rexine, 1987). A subcategory of this
debate is the issue of dispersing publicly acquired funds to parochial schools. At the inception of
government funded schools, the issue of allocating public tax dollars for parochial schools was
seemingly less controversial. However, school funding issues specific to the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment surfaced in the mid-twentieth century and remain a critical matter. Recent
judicial shifts away from separationism have furthered entanglement between church and state.
This study explored these shifts in judicial ideology pertaining to Blaine Amendments, identified
social and political factors contributing to the shifts, and predicted consequences if Blaine
Amendments are removed.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review explored the historical, social, and political contexts under which
Blaine Amendments arose and explore courts’ interpretations of relinquishing government aid to
public schools. To begin, a review of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause in the United
States Constitution provides insight into federal protection from state-sponsored religion. After
thorough review of the Establishment Clause, a historical analysis of Blaine Amendments at the
federal and state level is provided. From there, prominent Blaine Amendment Classification
theories are explained (Borders, 2018; Kemerer, 1998). Following classification theories,
emphasis is placed on the waves of school finance litigation set forth by Thro (1994) and
extended by various scholars (McMillan, 1998).
First Amendment – Religion Clauses
Prior to an exploration of Blaine Amendments or religious education funding issues, it is
necessary to examine the First Amendment’s religion provisions in the United States
Constitution as it serves as the framework for provisions that prohibit publicly funding religious
institutions. The opening sentence of the First Amendment reads, “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise therof...” (U.S. Const.
amend. I). Since its inception in 1791, multiple examinations of these words, formally referred to
as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause have led to a wide array of
interpretations. Highlighting “the duality created by these two clauses,” Wood and Petko (2000)
argued Religion Clauses prohibit the government from advancing religion, but also should not
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impede an individual from practicing a religion of their choice (p. 1). Adopting and embracing
these interpretations has led to disagreements within the judiciary. Specifically, there is
substantial disagreement regarding the clause’s limits (Boyer, 2009). Depicting the relationship
between the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, Geier (2020) posited the clauses
“construct a perfect environment for conflict between church and state to arise in public schools”
(p. 287). Defining the limits of the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause is a task the
Supreme Court of the United States continues to grapple with as shifts judicial ideology establish
new precedent.
Establishment Clause
After decades of debate, the meaning of the Establishment Clause remains difficult to
identify plainly (Barclay et al., 2019). Shifts in judicial ideology continue to alter the
interpretation and application of the Establishment Clause. An early interpretation by Choper
(1968), identified the Establishment Clause “sought to protect taxpayers from being forced by
the federal government to support religion” (p. 267). More recent scholarship on the First
Amendment has espoused McConnell’s (2003) Establishment Clause definition of, “the
promotion and inculcation of a common set of beliefs through government authority” (p. 2131).
Further, establishment is not uniform in nature. Establishment of religion may present itself in
various forms from narrow to broad (McConnell, 2003). To date, the Court has not developed a
framework for reviewing Establishment Clause issues, nor has it recognized any procedures for
relying upon history (Genshaft, 2001). This, in part, represents the reality that our nation’s
guiding documents recognize a deity.
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Free Exercise Clause
Similar to the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause has fluctuated between
strict and flexible interpretations (Ray, 2018). As highlighted by Gressman and Carmella (1996),
“The sparse language of the Free Exercise Clause makes it one of the many majestic generalities
of the constitution (p. 69). A shift in the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause was
established in Employment Division v. Smith (1990). In Smith, “a facially neutral and generally
applicable law does not receive strict scrutiny, even if it substantially burdens the claimant’s
exercise of religion” (Walker, 2007, p. 412). Responding to the judicial precedent set forth in
Smith, Congress passed, and President Bill Clinton signed into law the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA). Among many things, RFRA “restored strict scrutiny to the law of free
exercise” (Walker, 2007, p. 412). In the case of Espinoza, the Court expressed the “Free Exercise
Clause ‘protects religious observers against unequal treatment’ and against ‘laws that impose
special disabilities on the basis of religious status’” (Espinoza v. Montana, 2020).
Interpreting Religion Clauses
This study focused on two interpretations of the Religion Clauses; strict separation and
accomodationism. Each played a significant role in establishing Supreme Court precedent and
continue to be ideological frameworks for ruling on education cases involving the Religion
Clauses. Although the two interpretations of the Religion Clauses may seem polarizing, the
Court has been repeatedly relied upon to find the equilibrium between strict separation and
religious accommodation (McCarthy, 1981).
Additionally, the interpretations explained below represent two distinct ideological
camps, but they do not stand as the only interpretations of the Religion Clauses. Described in the
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classification theories of Blaine Amendments, Frank Kemmerer (1998) and Mark DeForrest
(2003) expanded upon these interpretations in their respective theories.
Strict Separation
Strict separation between church and state was a judicial ideology promoted in both the
19th and 20th centuries. Perhaps the most influential interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendments to the United States Constitution is Thomas Jefferson’s (1802) ‘separation of
church and state.’ Jefferson was a leading advocate for the ‘separation principle’ which sought to
distance religion from other issues of the state (Alexander & Alexander, 2019). In his final letter
written to the Danbury Baptists, Jefferson (1802) expressly stated, “I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should
‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion…thus building a wall of separation
between Church & State.”
In analyzing the wall of separation, Sughrue (2017) highlighted that a “strict separation
approach is grounded in a no aid whatsoever relationship between government and religion”
(p.5). The theme for the remainder of this work is perhaps best found in the words of Alexander
and Alexander (2019) as they argued “the issue of separation and interrelationship between
religion and government retains its characteristic preeminence as perhaps the most divisive issue
in American society” (p. 199).
Crucial to the development of Blaine Amendments, judicial interpretation of the extent to
which the Bill of Rights applies to individual states shifted over a series of decades. Delivering
the majority opinion in the case of Permoli v. Municipality No.1 of the City of New Orleans,
1845, Justice Cantron argued;
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The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in
their religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws: nor is there any
inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect on the states.
(Permoli v. Municipality No.1 of the City of New Orleans, 1845)
The adoption of the 14th Amendment in 1868 is the origin of the incorporation doctrine which
prohibited states from implementing “any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States” (U.S. Const. amend. XIV). However, it was not until the earlymid 20th century that the Supreme Court of the United States, in Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940),
gave legal recognition to the incorporation doctrine. In Cantwell, the Court held “The First
Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of
the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws” (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 1940).
In 1947, nearly 156 years post the inception of the First Amendment, Jeffries and Ryan
(2001) recognized a shift in judicial interpretation and application that they refer to as the
“modern Establishment Clause” (p. 284). The Court’s ideological shift is first seen in the case of
Everson v. Board of Education (1947) (Jeffries & Ryan, 2001). Of significance, Everson
(discussed in greater detail below) stands as the first time the Court accepted and utilized a strict
separationist theory when ruling on an Establishment Clause case (Jeffries & Ryan, 2001). While
Everson served as a turning point for the application of the Establishment Clause, it failed to
institute widespread use of strict separationist (Jeffries & Ryan, 2001).
Accommodation
Although strict separation is a foundational concept employed in many mid-twentieth
century church-state education funding cases, the principle of accommodation predates the strict
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separation set forth by Everson. Accommodationist, as explained by Carolyn Deverich (2006),
allow “church-state interface as long as it does not interfere with a citizens freedom of religious
exercise” (p. 215). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that parochial institutions may
receive public aid, so long as the aid benefits the student and does not further religious
institutions (McCarthy, 1981). Historical examples include, but are not limited to, Mueller v.
Allen (1982), Agostini v. Felton (1997), and Mitchell v. Helms (2000).
Differing from strict separation, as highlighted by Alexander & Alexander (2019) is that
“Supreme Court precedents of today hold that government aid to religion simply be
‘nonpreferential,’ not that there should be complete separation” (p. 236). This is evidenced by
caselaw at both the local and federal levels. Moving past the concept of prohibiting relationships
between church and state, the Supreme Court has lessened the linkage between modern doctrine
and original intent (Jeffries & Ryan, 2001). Further, religious accommodation does not exist as
fixed point. For the purposes of this research, religious accommodation is the antithesis of strict
separation, encompassing all breaches in the wall of separation between church and state.
More recent cases of Trinity Lutheran v. Comer (2017) and Espinoza v. Montana (2020)
signal the Court’s acceptance of funding secular components of parochial schools. The Court’s
embracement of “accommodationist neutrality,” a phrase introduced by Massaro (2005), refers to
the idea that secular and non-secular ideas “receive ‘neutral’ treatment within the public sphere
(p. 936). The Court’s current embracement of neutrality is coupled with the politically
conservative effort to confront religious discrimination.
History of Blaine Amendments
The relationship between religion and schools has a long-standing history that was not
always fraught with controversy. Entanglement between religion and public education has not
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always been interpreted as unconstitutional and in many instances society favored and expected
religion to be taught in schools (Viteritti, 1998). Blaine Amendments did not emerge
unprompted. Social and political happenings around the nation cultivated an environment
conducive to the development and proliferation of state amendments that prohibit the public
funding of parochial schools. To appropriately frame this historical perspective, this literature
review explored the social and political history of the early to late 19th century. In the following
commentary, the author reflects on the relatively recent birth of our nation as well as the societal
influences, domestic and abroad, that shape our laws.
Until the early 19th century, linkages between religion and morality were widely accepted
by many Americans (Green, 1992). Although there is much debate over George Washington’s
Christian beliefs and practices, he championed the importance of religion and morality, viewing
them as necessary components of happiness and “essential for ensuring the sanctity of oaths”
(Hall, p. 2019, p. 35). Further still, John Adams, a self-proclaimed devout Christian who
entertained a profession in the clergy, held deeply that religion was the most crucial foundational
aspect of acquiring moral happiness (Fea, 2016). America’s founders embracement of religion
was specific to the Christian denomination of Protestantism. Consequently, early forms of public
education were predominantly Protestant and made reading from the King James Bible a
common practice (Green, 1992; Komer, 2018). Tensions specific to religion and public schools
spawned in the mid to late 19th century (Borders, 2018). In an attempt to stifle Protestantism’s
establishment as the dominant religion in public schools the United States saw an increase in
Catholic schools (Sondergard, 2018). Once established, Catholic school leaders advocated for
public support in the form of monetary aid (Green, 1992).
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Although Catholicism was a minority religion at that time, shifts in immigration had a
tremendous effect on America’s development. The United States of America saw a rapid
increase of immigrants during the mid-19th century (Burke & Stepman, 2014; Borders, 2018).
Irish and German immigrants expressly advocated for their children to learn Catholic beliefs and
values from the Douay Version of the Bible (Adams, 2011). The sharp influx in Catholic
immigrants was met with strong anti-Catholic viewpoints by much of America (Sondergard,
2018). As Duncan (2003) highlighted, Catholics were not well accepted by members of the
established Protestant faith and received an immense amount of hatred. Disdain for the Catholic
faith was met with the perception that Catholic immigrants were “un-American” (Jeffries &
Ryan, 2001, p. 303). Further, the separation between Protestantism and Catholicism extended
past theological differences and incorporated political, cultural, and racial disparities (Jeffries &
Ryan, 2001). Many state constitutions strictly prohibited Catholics from holding a political office
by requiring political actors to be Protestants (Komer, 2018). One political party in particular, the
Know-Nothings, an anti-Catholic party, led the battle against Southern European immigrants
(Adams, 2011). Primarily existing in secrecy, the Know-Nothing party was named after its
organizational catch phrase of “I know nothing,” which the party used when questioned about
the party (Adams, 2011).
The rise in the Catholic population was followed by a significant increase in the Catholic
church’s political power (DeForrest, 2013). This increase in political power also aided the
establishment of Catholic schools. Just as the more dominant Protestant schools, Catholic school
leadership sought government aid to develop and maintain its schools (Flowers, 2005). However,
even with the momentum of rising political power in the 1840s, Catholics were not successful in
advancing education efforts in the early 19th century (DeForrest, 2013). Not only were such

15

efforts unsuccessful, but they were also largely met with threats or acts of physical violence and
severe property damage. A prominent example occurred in 1842 after a Catholic bishop of New
York promoted allocating public funds for sectarian schools. In light of the bishop’s advocacy, a
mob succeeded in burning down his residence and state troops were deployed to ward off
cathedral attacks (Viteritti, 1998). Another frequently referenced example of what can be
classified as anti-Semitic behavior was the expulsion of Bridget Donahue in 1854. As is noted in
the case of Donahoe v. Richards, (1854) Donahoe was expelled from school in response to her
refusal to read from the King James Version of the Bible. As a substitute, Donahoe proposed the
school allow her to read from the Duay Bible but her request was denied (Donahoe v. Richards,
1854). Upon hearing the facts of the case, the Supreme Court of Maine upheld Bible reading and
argued that the school has the authority to select instructional materials and discipline students
(Donahoe v. Richards, 1854). Further, the court held that the King James Version is not
sectarian, and the school was not required to provide a religious accommodation (DeForrest,
2013).
Following the Civil War, Catholicism continued to gain momentum and broaden its
political influence (Green, 1992; DeForrest, 2013). Nearly 15 years after the Donahoe case, the
Cincinnati School Board passed a pair of resolutions intended to cease Bible reading and
religious instruction in public schools (Green, 1992). The resolutions generated strong Protestant
opposition. Prior to implementation of the resolutions, a group of Protestants acquired an
injunction with the trial court (Green, 1992). The trial court’s decision to uphold the injunction
was heavily contested by the Cincinnati School Board. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court
accepted the case (Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Minor, 1872). After thorough review of
the facts of the case, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the injunction and restored the school
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board’s resolutions citing “broad school board authority over educational matters” (Green, 1992,
p. 46). The court’s decision to reinstate the school board’s resolutions made clear that the state
legislature was permitted to pass laws with the intent of protecting all religions; however,
Protestantism was not the only protected religion (Green, 1992). The Ohio Supreme Court’s
decision was far from popular and fueled strong opposition to Catholicism, specifically the
public funding of Catholic schools.
Emergence of the Proposed Federal Blaine Amendment
While the term Blaine Amendment is frequently used to describe state constitutional
amendments that prohibit religious schools from receiving public aid, it is important to recognize
that 14 states (Michigan, Florida, Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio, Massachusetts, Oregon, Minnesota,
Kansas, South Carolina, Illinois, Virginia, and Pennsylvania) had established Blaine language
prior to the introduction of the federal amendment in 1875 (Green, 1992; Burke & Stepman,
2014).
Senator James Blaine is credited as the primary driving force behind the federally
proposed and multi-state adopted Blaine Amendments. In his time spent in politics, Blaine
attempted to obtain the presidency on three separate occasions (Burke & Stepman, 2014).
Although Blaine led the attempt to establish a constitutional amendment that barred public
funding of religious schools, he himself was of Irish Catholic ancestry (Alexander & Alexander,
2019). Moreover, “Blaine’s mother was Catholic… Blaine attended Catholic religious services
as a child, and had probably been baptized in the Catholic Church” (Alexander & Alexander,
2019, p. 234). Per the request of his mother, Blaine adopted and practiced the religious beliefs of
his father, a known Protestant (Klinkhamer, 1956). While Blaine did not attend Catholic services
in his adult life he was known for his “Catholic sympathies” (Green, 2003, p. 195). Instead of
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attending protestant-dominant public schools he enrolled his daughters in Catholic boarding
schools (Green, 2003).
Analysis of the political landscape during the mid-late 19th century highlighted a speech
delivered by Ulysses S. Grant to The Society of the Army of Tennessee in 1875. In his speech,
then President Grant spoke of unity and his desire to end divisiveness between northern and
southern states (Alexander & Alexander, 2019). Placing significant emphasis on unifying the
nation, Grant predicted “that the dividing line will not be Mason and Dixon’s, but between
patriotism and intelligence on the one side and superstition, ambition and ignorance on the
other.” In the latter portion of his speech, Grant illuminated his vision for American schools.
Adopting a strict separationist viewpoint, former President Grant argued;
Encourage free schools and resolve that not one dollar of money appropriated to their
support, no matter how raised, shall be appropriated to the support of any sectarian
school. Resolve that the state or Nation or both combined shall furnish, to every child
growing up in the land, the means of acquiring a good common-school education,
unmixed with sectarian, pagan, or atheistic tenets. Leave the matter of religion to the
family altar, the church, and the private school supported entirely by private
contributions. Keep the church and state forever separate (Swisher, 1925, p. 413
(Swisher, 1925)).
Given the turmoil leading up to Grant’s speech, his words were well received to the extent that
he was featured in then prominent periodicals, the Chicago Tribune and Christian Advocate
(Green, 1992). However, expansion of federal power was not hailed by all. In opposition to the
federal government determining states’ rights, McGreevy (2003) expressed, “Catholics and
southerners alike constantly warned of an expanding federal state” (p. 111). Additionally, much
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of Grant’s speech was in step with partisan politics. Although he preached of unity and
opposition to conflict-ridden rhetoric, Grant’s message “clearly aligned the Republican Party
with the Protestant cause” (Green, 1992, p. 48).
Grant’s hostility towards government funding of religious schools was coupled with his
advocacy for “good common school education,” or “common schools” (DeForrest, 2013, p. 558).
Led by Horace Mann, Massachusetts’ Secretary of Education, the purpose of common schools
was to provide “explicitly religious moral instruction,” inclusive of daily Bible reading,
recitation of the Lord’s Prayer, and singing of religious songs (Duncan, 2003). Although
common schools were proposed on the basis that they are free of sectarianism, their curricula
were inclusive of protestant ideology (DeForrest, 2013). Not only was Protestantism the
established, dominant Christian denomination of schooling, Viteritti (1998) described common
schools as “intolerant of those who are non-believers” (p. 666). Built on the premise that no
sectarian schools would receive public aid, it was soon evident the common schools initiative
was designed with the intent of excluding Catholic schools from public aid (Viteritti, 1998).
Grant’s speech, coupled with James Blaine’s desire to obtain the presidency is attributed
to inciting motivation for the development of the proposed federal amendment (Lantta, 2004;
Alexander & Alexander, 2019). Blaine Amendments arose as an attempt to close every path by
which public aid might flow to religious institutions (Jeffries & Ryan, 2001). As Alexander and
Alexander (2019) argued, the original, federally proposed Blaine Amendment was designed
specifically to “deter religious intolerance that threatened the unity of the nation” (p. 235). Still,
Lantta (2004) claimed that Blaine intentionally attached himself to anti-Catholic rhetoric in an
attempt to gain support from Protestant communities. Given his Irish Catholic ancestry,
questions swirled about Blaine’s current religious affiliation to the extent that some referred to
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him as a “closet Catholic” (Alexander & Alexander, 2019, p. 234). The federal amendment in its
original language is as follows:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of
public schools, or derived from any public fund therefore, nor any public lands devoted
thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so
raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations. (4 Cong.
Rec. 5558, 5595 (1876))
Accordingly, “Protestants hailed the amendment, but the Catholic Church bitterly
contested it” (Adams, 2012). While the federal amendment was received well in the House of
Representatives and passed by an overwhelming majority, it failed to gain support from
Democrats in the Senate and perished on a party line vote (Adams, 2012). The failure is largely
attributed to two key changes that were made by the Senate Judiciary Committee (Komer, 2018).
The first of the two changes involved a provision stating the bill is not a deterrent to Bible
reading in public schools (Komer, 2018). A second change came as the Senate Judiciary
Committee “expanded the proscription on use of school funds for sectarian schools to the
proscription on use of any public funds” (Komer, 2018, p. 570). The Senate’s iteration of the
Blaine Amendment emerged as an attempt to eliminate religion from common schools but fell
short of prohibiting Bible reading altogether (Jeffries & Ryan, 2001).
Should the amendment have passed, it would have been the 16th Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Of significance is that a congressionally-approved Blaine
Amendment would have applied the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to states, and
of greater significance, would have strengthened the barrier between church and state by barring
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state governments from allocating public funds to religious organizations (DeForrest, 2013).
Following the collapse of the federal Blaine Amendment, no subsequent federal proposal
achieved the necessary two-thirds majority in each chamber of congress (Klinkhamer, 1956).
The Rise of State Blaine Amendments
As previously mentioned, prior to the federally proposed Blaine Amendment, 14 states
had constitutional language that prohibited publicly funding parochial schools. New York was
the first state to implement constitutional language restricting religious schools from receiving
public aid (Duncan, 2003). Although the rise and fall of the federal Blaine Amendment was
brief, its ideological undertones were received well by many states (Conklin & Vache, 1985;
Jeffries & Ryan, 2001; Lantta, 2004). In response to the failed federal amendment, 15 more
states had adopted Blaine language by 1890. Appendix A provides Blaine language found in 37
state constitutions. In spite of a failed constitutional amendment, Congress found secondary
means to further hinder parochial schools from accessing public funds.
In 1876, Congress required each territory joining the Union to include Blaine language in
their state constitutions (Jeffries & Ryan, 2001; DeForrest, 2003; Swan, 2003; Adams, 2012).
Established in 1889, the Enabling Act was proposed and approved, permitting the Dakotas,
Montana, and Washington State to draft a state constitution but required them to include
language that prohibits sectarian schools from receiving public aid (Jeffries & Ryan, 2001).
Absent congressional consent, state Blaine Amendments could not be redacted or renounced
(Jeffries & Ryan, 2001). Consequently, every state west of Iowa, inclusive of Alaska and
Hawaii, has Blaine language in its constitution (Burke & Stepman, 2014). Since their
establishment, most Blaine Amendments have largely remained untouched (Schwartz, 2008). To
date, Louisiana is the only state to repeal their Blaine Amendment. In 1973 voters approved a
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new state constitution that replaced Blaine Amendment language with language from the
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause (Komer, 2018). Conversely, Michigan stands as
the only state that has strengthened its Blaine Amendment since its inception (Komer, 2018).
Although a federal Blaine amendment, consisting of a singular body of language, would
have unilaterally drawn a line between what is constitutionally permissible and impermissible,
language of state Blaine Amendments varies considerably (Borders, 2018).
Classification Theories
In review of state Blaine Amendments, it appears that two primary classification theories
emerge (Borders, 2018). Viewing state Blaine Amendments as categorical, Frank Kemerer
established classifications of restrictive, permissive, and uncertain (Kemerer, 1998). Similarly,
Mark DeForrest (2003) defined Blaine Amendments as existing on a continuum, spanning from
narrow restriction to broad restriction. Each of the classification theories represent categories
ranging from strict separation to accommodation.
Kemerer’s Approximations
Early in his explanation, Kemerer (1998) eagerly urges readers to view Blaine
classifications as “approximations” (p. 162). Beginning with restrictive state constitutions,
Kemerer (1998) claimed that such states prohibit vouchers and furthermore, proscribe direct and
indirect aid to religious schools. Further explaining the separation of restrictive states from an
alternative category is what Kemerer (1998) referred to as “political purpose doctrine” (p. 169).
Plainly, political purpose doctrine mandates that public funds must be earmarked for public use
(Kemerer, 1998). Oklahoma’s strict constitutional language serves as an example of what
Kemerer (1998) defined as restrictive. Oklahoma’s Blaine language reads,
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No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, donated, or used,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or
system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher or dignitary, or sectarian institution as such. Oklahoma Const. Art.
II, § 5
Following the category of restrictive states, Kemerer (1998) moved to identify permissive
Blaine language in state constitutions that do not contain an anti-establishment provision.
Largely, state supreme courts in permissive states have not interpreted the state constitution as
“an impediment to educational programs encompassing sectarian private schools” (Kemerer,
1998, p. 171). However, it is not uncommon for permissive states to refrain from providing
direct aid to religious institutions (Kemerer, 1998). In review of state constitutional language,
Alabama’s constitution contains permissive Blaine language. The Alabama amendment states,
No appropriation shall be made to any charitable or educational institution not under the
absolute control of the state, other than normal schools established by law for the
professional training of teachers for the public schools of the state, except by a vote of
two-thirds of all the members elected to each house. Alabama Const. Art. IV, § 73
Noting the shift from restrictive language, Alabama’s permissive amendment does not openly
prohibit indirect aid to religious institutions. Further, it potentially allows for direct funding
pending a two-thirds majority vote in each house.
Moving from states classified as permissive, Kemerer’s (1998) final category is
recognized as uncertain. Certain states have constitutional provisions prohibiting disbursement of
direct aid to religious institutions but refrain from making a determination regarding the
constitutionality of indirect funding. As Kemerer (1998) cited, state constitutions recognized as
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uncertain may contain “ambiguous constitutional terminology” or lacking “authoritative
caselaw” (p. 174). In comparison to restrictive and permissive, Kemerer (1998) identified the
majority of state constitutional language falls within the uncertain approximation. Exemplifying
constitutional language classified as uncertain, Arizona’s state constitution holds, “No public
money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or
instruction, or to the support of any religious establishment” Arizona Const. Art. II, § 12.
In sum, Kemerer (1997) found 17 states to have restrictive language in their state
constitution, an additional 14 states were permissive, and the remaining 19 states had a
classification of uncertain.
DeForrest’s Continuum
More recently, Mark DeForrest (2003) recognized state Blaine Amendments as existing
on a continuum running from narrow restriction to broad restriction. Narrow restrictions were
defined as those that hinder “indirect assistance or aid to private religious or sectarian education”
(DeForrest, 2003, p. 577). Blaine Amendments with narrow restrictions function under the
umbrella of two basic concerns:
1. Public schools of all levels are free of religious education.
2. There is no direct allocation of public funds to religious schools. (DeForrest, 2003)
Using the criteria put forth by DeForrest (2003), two states fall in the narrow restrictions
category; New Jersey and Massachusetts. Both New Jersey and Massachusetts allow for specific
instances in which students attending a parochial school may receive assistance (e.g.,
transportation in New Jersey, higher education grants in Massachusetts) (DeForrest, 2003). An
excerpt from the Massachusetts state constitution explains, “Nothing herein contained shall be
construed to prevent the Commonwealth from making grants-in-aid to private higher educational
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institution or to students or parents or guardians of students attending such institutions”
(Massachusetts Const. Amend. Art. XVIII, § 2).
Stepping away from narrow restrictions, DeForrest (2003) defined the next group of
Blaine Amendments as “moderate” (p. 578). The ends of the moderate category are far more
expansive than that of the narrow restriction. This is, in part, due to the wide variation of
language used between each state (DeForrest, 2003). It is not uncommon for states in this
category to strictly prohibit direct, public aid to parochial schools but fail to establish the
constitutionality of indirect funding in the form of school vouchers (DeForrest, 2003). An
example of DeForrest’s (2003) moderate language is found in Delaware’s constitution. The
Delaware state constitution holds,
No portion of any fund now existing, or which may hereafter be appropriated, or raised
by tax, for educational purposes, shall be appropriated to, or used by, or in aid of any
sectarian, church or denominational school; provided, that all real or personal property
used for school purposes, where the tuition is free, shall be exempt from taxation and
assessment for public purposes. Delaware Const. Art X, § 3
This classification is most relatable to Kemerer’s (1998) approximation of uncertain.
The third and final category of Blaine language is referred to by DeForrest (2003) as
“most restrictive” (p. 587). States with most restrictive language have far reaching constraints on
direct and indirect forms of religious aid (DeForrest, 2003). Advancing the definition of
moderate provisions, most restrictive provisions move past religious schools to ensure that
religious institutions as a whole are prohibited from receiving public aid (DeForrest, 2003). State
constitutional encompassing religious entities beyond educational institutions can be found in
Florida. Florida’s state constitution demands,
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No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken
from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious
denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution. Florida Const. Art. I, § 3
In summation of the clearly defined continuum, DeForrest (2003) highlighted, “State
Blaine Amendments do not exist in a vacuum” (p. 602). This sentiment resonates with Kemerer’s
(1998) urge for consideration of Blaine classifications as approximations. Both scholars shed
light on the fluidity of interpretation pending the circumstances encompassing a specific
instance. To date, the Court has not formally acknowledged or established either of the
categorical theories presented above. A compilation of all state Blaine language can be found in
Appendix A.
Impeding Religious Schools
This body of work would not be complete without a thorough review of the two points
held by proponents of Blaine Amendments, religious discrimination and a barrier to school
choice. Given the socio-political history leading up to the development of Blaine Amendments, it
comes as no surprise that many Blaine opponents stand strong in their united front against
religious intolerance (Viteritti, 1998; DeForrest, 2003; Adams, 2011). Upon review of State
Blaine Amendments, DeForrest (2003) argued that most discriminate against religion and
therefore violate of the First Amendment. Commenting on Blaine language embedded within
state constitutions, Sondergard (2018) posited current interpretations of the separation of church
and state will potentially lead to “unfair discrimination against religions organizations,” making
it increasingly difficult for parents to choose a religious schooling option (p. 780). Similarly,
Viteritti (1998) clearly articulated his opposition to Blaine Amendments by identifying them as
“religious bigotry” put forth by “nativist political leaders” in response to an influx in Catholic
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immigration (p. 658). Collectively, State Blaine Amendments are unconstitutional as they
intentionally and effectively penalize religious institutions, strictly because they are religiously
affiliated, by prohibiting them from acquiring public assistance (Duncan, 2003).
Additionally, much research is dedicated to Blaine Amendments’ infringement upon a
child’s parent or legal guardian to make educational decisions (Sondergard, 2018; Burke &
Stepman, 2014; Borders, 2018). The school choice movement is characterized by individuals and
groups seeking to expand educational offerings in a variety of settings. Defining Blaine
Amendments as “ignoble,” Burke and Stepman (2014) view such language as an obstruction to
school choice. Similarly, Komer (2018) went as far to say that Blaine Amendments have a
“pernicious effect” of disallowing parents the opportunity to make educational choices (p. 611).
Of particular significance, as argued by Burke and Stepman (2014) is the extent to which Blaine
language serves as a barrier that prohibits students with special needs from obtaining necessary
services. Further, Burke and Stepman (2014) contest the discriminatory intent and effect of
Blaine Amendments and urge states to “enact policies that allow parents to direct their child’s
share of funding to any education service or provider of choice (p. 638).
Waves of School Finance Litigation
Waves of litigation emerged as a result of the judiciary struggling to define and limit its
capacity (McMillan, 1998). William Thro (1994) argued that school finance litigation can be
classified into three eras. The first wave is situated in the 1960s through 1973 and according to
Thro (1994) is comprised of equality suits or, litigation “premised on the belief that more money
meant a better education and on a lack of tolerance for any differences in money or
opportunities” (p. 601). Following the first wave, the second wave of school finance litigation
spans from 1973 to 1989 and remained focused on equality however, through the means of state
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constitutions. The third and final wave defined by Thro (1994) encompasses litigation from 1989
through the late 1990s and has three core tenets:
•

All children are entitled to an education of a certain quality

•

Primarily focused on education clauses in individual states

•

Courts have cast wider decisions and demonstrated “willingness to take control of the
financing of education” (p. 603).
Although each of the aforementioned waves are characterized by trends in school finance

litigation, this research explored the extent to which similarly themed waves can be identified in
religion and public schools litigation. Similarly, judicial ideology derived from the cases
highlighted below will be used to examine historical and current issues involving religion and
public schools.
Exploring School Finance Waves
The first wave is characterized by two prominent cases in the early 1970s: Serrano v.
Priest (1971) and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973). In Rodriguez,
appellees’ argued that Texas’ public education finance system violated the Equal Protection
Clause set forth by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Delivering the
opinion of the Court, Justice Powell proclaimed,
Apart from the unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of education may be
determined by the amount of money expended for it, a sufficient answer to appellees'
argument is that, at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not
require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. Nor, indeed, in view of the
infinite variables affecting the educational process, can any system assure equal quality
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of education except in the most relative sense. (San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, 1973)
The Court’s 5-4 decision in Rodriguez rejects the argument that variance in funding formulas due
to geographic location adversely affects a specific subgroup of individuals; furthermore, unequal
expenditures do not inherently violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Moving into the second wave, in response to impasse at the federal level, school finance
reform efforts targeted state equal protection claims and were litigated in state courts. Although
litigation shifted from federal to state, McMillan (1998) highlighted, “plaintiffs’ claims generally
arose from identical circumstances of disparity and were argued in the same manner as the
claims in the first wave (p. 1872).”
The beginning of the second wave of school finance litigation is marked by New Jersey
Supreme Court case, Robinson v. Cahill (1973). In Robinson, the plaintiffs argued the New
Jersey school financing system violated the education provision of the New Jersey Supreme
Court (Alexander & Alexander, 2019). Specifically, the New Jersey State Constitution stated that
“the legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system
of free public schools” (N.J. Const. art. 8, § 4). Plaintiffs argued that under the State equal
protection clause, “thorough and efficient” advanced education as a fundamental interest and
“directly under the education clause, arguing that the guarantee of a thorough and efficient
education was not being met in property-poor districts” (Martell, 1977, p. 147). While the court
found that plaintiffs had been denied a thorough and efficient education, it did not uphold the
supposition of an equal protection clause violation (Martell, 1997).
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The third wave is signified by the judiciaries discernable pivot from equality standards in
education finance. As identified by Thro (1994) cases situated in the third wave of school finance
litigation are distinguished by three primary characteristics:
•

Children are entitled to an education of a certain quality

•

Cases are “based exclusively on the education clauses of individual states’ constitutions”

•

“Courts have been more sweeping in their pronouncements and their willingness to take
control of the financing of education” (p. 603).
In mid-January 1989, Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State (1989) marked the shift

from the second to third wave. In Helena, plaintiffs’ argue against the constitutionality of the
funding methods used for public schools in the state of Montana, citing significant wealth
disparities among schools. Affirming the District Court’s decision, the Supreme Court of
Montana found the Montana school funding system to be unconstitutional.
Although the third wave saw an enormous amount of support from various stakeholders,
it does not mark the terminus of school finance waves (McMillan, 1998). As McMillan (1998)
highlighted, “The third wave is not immune from judicial scrutiny (p. 1882).” As the third wave
began, it was anticipated that courts would play a vital role in determining standards of
adequacy. It is also argued that fourth wave spanning from the early 2000s to present day
encompasses cases distinguished by the extent that unequal education funding creates greater
separation between racial and socio-economic classes (McMillan, 1998). As McMillian (1998)
noted, the beginning of the fourth wave may very well be marked by Sheff v. O’Neill (1996). In
Sheff, the plaintiffs allege the unequal funding of Connecticut schools influenced racial
inequities in education and violated State Constitution amendments. In a 4-3 ruling in favor of
the plaintiffs, Judge C. J. Peters argued, “The uncontested evidence of the severe racial and
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ethnic isolation of Hartford’s schoolchildren demonstrates that the state has failed to fulfill its
affirmative constitutional obligation to provide all of the state’s schoolchildren with a
substantially equal educational opportunity (Sheff v. O’Neill, 1996).
While the previously determined waves (Thro, 1994) are specific to school finance
litigation, this work seeks to identify similar trends within litigation specific to religion and
public schools. Judicial ideology within the aforementioned waves will be considered when
analyzing shifts in religion and public schools cases. As this work explored factors contributing
to ideological shifts in the judiciary, Thro’s (1994) waves served as reference points for judicial
ideology specific to school funding.
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CHAPTER THREE:
METHODOLOGY

Methodologies employed in this study were qualitative in nature. The aforementioned
research questions were explored through traditional legal research and document analysis.
Specifically, data related to judicial ideologies were captured through traditional legal research.
This study adopted the definition of ‘ideology’ by (Merriam-Webster., n.d.)-Webster as “a
manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture” (see
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ideology). Additionally, the origin of Blaine
Amendments was captured through review of historical documents and scholarly works. Caselaw
specific to religion and public schools was the primary data source used to identify trends and
waves in litigation.

Table 3.1
Types and Kinds of Sources and Artifacts
Source Type

Artifact

Primary Sources

•
•

Caselaw
Congressional records

Secondary Sources

•
•

Law review articles
Books on topic

Tertiary Sources

•
•

Textbooks
Books on topic
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Data Collection
While traditional legal research uses precedent to forecast judicial interpretation, what “it
does not, and cannot, do is go beyond the law to consider the attitudes, values, and beliefs of
those affected by legal decisions. A critical attribute of traditional legal research is that the
“primary source of information is the law itself” (Russo, 2015, p. 6). Further, “it is a systematic
investigation involving the interpretation and explanation of the law” (Russo, 2015, p. 6) Finally,
“legal research employs a timeline that looks to the past, present, and future for a variety of
purposes” (Russo, 2015, p. 6).
Data collection began with ascertaining historical and legal references that could be used
to portray the development and inception of Blaine Amendments. Such references included
scholarly writing on Blaine Amendments and issues around the intersection of religion and
public schools as well as historical legal documents. Additionally, caselaw specific to the
Supreme Court of the United States was analyzed to determine judicial shifts in ideology.
Waves of finance litigation outlined by Thro (1994) served as a theoretical framework for
identifying trends in United States Supreme Court Cases involving funding of religious schools.
Specifically, this work assisted in identifying major shifts in the judiciary. Religious education
funding cases were not directly compared to time periods established by Thro (1994); instead,
cases were related to the ideology of each wave. The socio-political factors identified in each era
were also used to make connections and determine themes across nearly 73 years of litigation.
Specific criteria were established to aid in the selection of cases for review. The cases
selected met two primary standards:
1. The decision was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States.
2. A religious funding issue is a focal point of litigation.
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Focusing on litigation in the United States Supreme Court allowed for a sample of cases that
carried a high level of significance. While there were many Supreme Court cases dealing with
religion and public schools, each of the sample cases selected were specific to religious funding
issues.
Data Analysis
Prominent Supreme Court cases were subjected to document analysis. D (Frey, 2018)
document analysis is systematic and repeated review, examination, and interpretation of data
(Frey, 2018). As identified by Bowen (2009), document analysis “requires that data be examined
and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge”
(p. 27). Documents considered for analysis were classified as caselaw and identified by Cardno
(2018) as “strategic level documents” (p. 630). Although document analysis can be applied in a
variety of ways, it was specifically used in this work to “track change and development”
(Bowen, 2009, p. 30).
While Cardno (2018) provided a framework for conducting document analysis in the
education policy arena, the processes she outlined have been adapted for analyzing caselaw.
Although policy and caselaw differ, there is symmetry in their institutional effect. In highlighting
policy document analysis, Cardno (2018) described it as “a method for investigating the nature
of a policy document in order to look at both what lies behind it and within it” (p. 625). Specific
to policy document analysis, Cardno’s (2018) five categories were as follows:
1. Document production and location
2. Authorship and audience
3. Policy context
4. Policy text
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5. Policy consequences
When conducting document analysis for this study, categories and questions identified by
Cardno (2018) were adopted as a guide for analyzing each Supreme Court opinion. Most
notably, the word policy in categories three through five in Table 3.2 is replaced with caselaw.
Coupled with the adaptations of each category, corresponding questions were developed and
served as a guide for analyzing targeted areas of Cardno’s (2018) framework. The revised
categories and their corresponding questions are detailed in the table below.
Table 3.2
Document Analysis Categories and Corresponding Questions
Category

Corresponding Questions

Document production and location

What level of court delivered the opinion and
when?

Authorship and audience

Who authored the opinion?
What is their position, and do they have a
bias?

Caselaw context

What ideologies or values guide the opinion?

Caselaw text

How is the opinion structured?
What are the key elements of the opinion?
What is absent from the text?

Caselaw consequences

What is the intended overall impact of the
opinion?

Each category provided a specific lens from which trends in data were gleaned. For this
work, document production and location is specific to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Moving into the second category, authorship and audience, this work paid careful attention to the
justices penning the decisions and backgrounds of all parties involved. Transitioning to caselaw

35

context, this work examined the factors driving the relevancy of the case. Following caselaw
context, the actual text of each case will undergo examination. The fifth category, identified as
caselaw consequences, explored the social and political effects of each case.
Data collected in relation to each category were compared across Supreme Court
opinions issued in the cases selected for study. Focusing on the five distinct categories of
analysis for each case allowed for identification of distinct shifts in judicial ideology. When
analyzing majority opinions selected for review, consistent application of the aforementioned
categorical questions provided a framework for tracking judicial ideology and caselaw
consequences. While the Supreme Court of the United States is a multi-member judiciary, for the
purposes of this research the majority opinion was identified as one body.
Information acquired was then used to portray the institution of Blaine Amendments,
distinguish trends in religious education litigation, and identify shifts in judicial ideology. Using
the document analysis categories outlined by Cardno (2018), comparable data were acquired for
opinions issued in cases selected for study. Once relatable datasets were obtained, specific trends
in judicial ideology were identified. Data specific to the identification of trends in the judiciary
were aggregated to construct waves of litigation in funding parochial schools.
Additionally, supplemental sources were used to provide greater breadth and depth in the
areas of authorship and audience, and caselaw consequences. The introduction and incorporation
of secondary and tertiary sources aided in depicting the judicial ideology contributing to the case
as well as the impact of the majority opinion. Although, once published, Supreme Court opinions
remain unchanged, shifts in scholarly and judicial interpretation of caselaw language are to be
expected. Recognizing this phenomenon, this work captured caselaw interpretations from various
scholars in the field of education law.
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It is important to highlight that frequency-counting was not a component of this method.
As identified by George (2009), a frequency indicator is “the number of times one or more
content characteristics occur” (p. 154). Throughout the document analysis process conducted for
this study, a greater emphasis was placed on context and interpretation.
Limitations
This study was limited by the depth and breadth of litigation it covers. By selecting only
United States Supreme Court cases, this study did not encompass lower-level state and district
court cases that addressed the stated research questions but had a narrow scope. The sample of
Supreme Court cases selected was used to identify trends and potential consequences but was not
inclusive of every opinion on the subject of school funding and Religion Clauses. Additionally,
the intent of this research was to highlight broad shifts in jurisprudence impacting the Nation at
large. While a narrow sample of cases from a particular State court may have provided insight on
socio/political shifts within the state, it would not be appropriate or academically responsible to
assume such cases are representative of a national opinion.
Summary of Methodology
Through analysis of documents and caselaw, this research explained the history of Blaine
Amendments and identified shifts in judicial ideology pertaining to funding religious schools.
Analysis of each case began with a brief synopsis of the legal issue and subsequent Court ruling.
Specific caselaw was selected based on criteria referenced above. Judicial rationale across
multiple cases was compared to ideologies expressed in the waves in school finance litigation
defined by Thro (1994). While the time periods associated with the waves set forth by Thro
(1994) were representative of school finance litigation as a whole, the waves in this research
were indicative of large-scale shifts in the ideology of the judiciary. This comparison identified
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the extent to which trends were apparent in litigation pertaining to funding religious schools and,
furthermore, gave insight as to future direction of the Court.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
FINDINGS
This study focused on identifying socio-political shifts in the judiciary and trends in the
judicial ideology specific to publicly funding parochial schools. Data collected were also used to
determine consequences for educational institutions if Blaine Amendments are found to be
unconstitutional. Data collection involved thorough analysis of caselaw exclusively addressing
issues related to religion and school funding. Data analysis was conducted using an adapted
version of Cardno’s (2018) policy analysis framework. The framework was adapted to precisely
address caselaw using an established set of categories.
United States Supreme Court Caselaw
A review of nearly 73 years of caselaw from the Supreme Court of the United States
suggests that the Court has wavered from the hard line of strict separation to a more flexible
interpretation and application of the Establishment Clause. The Trinity decision made clear that
religious institutions cannot be denied public aid strictly because they are religiously affiliated
(Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 2017). Although the decision was narrowed by footnote 3, the
breadth of the decision may be overwhelming as the Court looks to establish precedent. As we
look to a new era of litigation on school funding, the permeability of the ‘wall of separation’
remains in question and may very well collapse under the gavel of the court.
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Caselaw
The Court has granted the hearing of a variety of cases dealing with issues regarding
entanglement between public aid and religious institutions. Outlined below are ten cases on
which the Supreme Court of the United States delivered an opinion. While these cases do not
stand as the only judicial interpretations of resources being allocated for religious schools, their
time and substance portray the Court’s jurisprudence over 70 years. Within the ten cases outlined
below, emphasis is placed on jurisprudence and the majority opinions. The final case, Espinoza
v. Montana (2020) stands as the most recent Supreme Court of the United States decision
specific to issues of publicly funding parochial schools.
Table 4.1
United States Supreme Court Cases for Analysis
Case
Everson v. Board of
Education, 1947
Lemon v. Kurtzman,
1971
Mueller v. Allen,
1982
Aguilar v. Felton,
1985
Agostini v. Felton,
1997
Mitchell v. Helms,
2000
Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 2002
Locke v. Davey,
2004
Trinity Lutheran v.
Comer, 2017
Montana v. Espinoza,
2020

Area of Litigation
First Amendment –
Establishment Clause
First Amendment –
Establishment Clause
First Amendment –
Establishment Clause
First Amendment –
Establishment Clause
First Amendment –
Establishment Clause
First Amendment –
Establishment Clause
First Amendment –
Establishment Clause
First Amendment –
Free Exercise Clause
First Amendment –
Free Exercise Clause
First Amendment –
Free Exercise Clause

Opinion Author
Hugo Black

Bench Spread
5-4

Warren Burger

8-0

William H. Rehnquist

5-4

William Brennan

5-4

Sandra Day O’Connor

5-4

Clarence Thomas

6-3

William H. Rehnquist

5-4

William H. Rehnquist

7-2

John G. Roberts

7-2

John G. Roberts

5-4
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Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
In Everson, the Court reviewed a New Jersey Law that allowed for reimbursements of
costs associated with transportation at public and nonpublic schools (Everson v. Board of
Education, 1947). In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Hugo Black, the Court found the New
Jersey Law did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United Sates
Constitution. The Court held that individuals of a particular religious faith could not be deprived
a public benefit due to their religious ascriptions (Everson v. Board of Education, 1947).
Authorship and Audience
Justice Hugo Black, a rural Alabama native, was born on February 27, 1886 (Perry,
1989). While in his younger years in Alabama, Black was heavily involved in the Baptist church.
Upon moving to Washington, Black significantly diminished his participation in the church
(Perry, 1989).
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Justice Black’s past was his open involvement
with the Ku Klux Klan. Black’s relationship with the Klan began when he formally joined in
Alabama in 1923 (Newman, 1997). Although Justice Black reportedly sympathized with the
Klan’s values, he was particularly drawn by their stentorian anti-Catholicism (Bertucio, 2020).
Reflecting on this topic, Justice Black’s son Hugo Jr. recalled, “The Ku Klux Klan and Daddy,
so far as I could tell, only had one thing in common. He suspected the Catholic church” (Black,
1975, p. 104).
Caselaw Context
Prior to the Supreme Court hearing Everson, multiple state courts had taken up the issue
of direct payments to non-public schools and found them to be unconstitutional in light of state
Blaine Amendments (Kauper, 1973). In Everson, a New Jersey statute allowed direct
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reimbursement for personal school transportation monies expended by parents. As was
highlighted in the case,
Part of this money was for the payment of transportation of some children in the
community to Catholic parochial schools. These church schools give their students, in
addition to secular education, regular religious instruction conforming to the religious
tenets and modes of worship of the Catholic Faith. The superintendent of these schools is
a Catholic priest. (Everson v. Board of Education, 1947)
Everson, acting as the appellant in the case, argued the statute violated the Federal and State
constitutions. Upon hearing the case, the State court found reimbursements for travel associated
with parochial schools to be unconstitutional. On appeal the New Jersey Court of Errors and
Appeals reversed, “holding that neither the statute or resolution passed pursuant to it was in
conflict with the State constitution or the provisions of the Federal Constitution in issue”
(Everson v. Board of Education, 1947). On November 20, 1946 the case was argued at the
Supreme Court of the United States. The alleged constitutional violation was specific to the
Establishment Clause in First Amendment.
Caselaw Text
In framing the decision, Justice Black offered the sentiment below as a reminder of the
institutional power and political wars between various religions.
The centuries immediately before and contemporaneous with the colonization of America
had been filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, generated in large part by
established sects determined to maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy.
With the power of government supporting them, at various times and places, Catholics
had persecuted Protestants, Protestants had persecuted Catholics, Protestant sects had
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persecuted other Protestant sects, Catholics of one shade of belief had persecuted
Catholics of another shade of belief, and all of these had from time to time persecuted
Jews. In efforts to force loyalty to whatever religious group happened to be on top and in
league with the government of a particular time and place, men and women had been
fined, cast in jail, cruelly tortured, and killed. Among the offenses for which these
punishments had been inflicted were such things as speaking disrespectfully of the views
of ministers of government-established churches, non-attendance at those churches,
expressions of non-belief in their doctrines, and failure to pay taxes and tithes to support
them. (Everson v. Board of Education, 1947)
Attempting to find balance between the rights of individuals and equal access to a
generally available benefit, Justice Black argued,
We must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against state-established
churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending its
general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious belief.
(Everson v. Board of Education, 1947)
Finding no constitutional violation, Justice Black closed his argument stating, “The First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and
impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it here”
(Everson v. Board of Education, 1947). While the Court found that providing bus fare
reimbursements for students attending parochial schools was constitutional, the closing phrase in
the majority emboldens the wall of separation between church and state.
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Caselaw Consequences
Although the majority found reimbursement for transportation fares to be constitutional,
the Court’s opinion established the foundation for strict separation (Beerworth, 2004). The
Everson ruling “nationalized the restrictions” within the Establishment Clause and unearthed
“comprehensive surveillance” of statutory and local regulations specific to religion (Kauper,
1973, p.307). Of significance, Everson had a direct effect on the interpretation of state
constitutional provisions (Kauper, 1973). Ideology utilized in Everson established judicial
precedent relied upon by the Court for future Establishment Clause cases.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
Nearly 24 years later, the Court was faced with yet another Establishment Clause issue in
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971). In Lemon, the Court addressed the constitutionality of Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island school funding statutes that allow for public funding of church-related
elementary schools. While Rhode Island sought to “authorize state officials to supplement the
salaries of teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools,” the Pennsylvania
statute expressly allowed for nonpublic schools to receive public aid (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971).
Petitioners claim the statutes are in clear violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971). Written by Chief Justice Burger, an 8-0 majority in the
Pennsylvania case, and 8-1 in the Rhode Island case found such amendments to be
unconstitutional.
Authorship and Audience
Born in St. Paul Minnesota in 1907, Justice Burger experienced a customary 20th century
upbringing. Although Justice Burger was presented with the opportunity to attend Princeton
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University on scholarship, he rejected the offer as he felt obligated to support his family
(McLellan, 1996). After attending a night law school, Justice Burger enjoyed a successful law
career and became involved with Republican politics (Rehnquist, 1987). Moving on from
practicing law, he worked in the Justice Department under President Eisenhower before
transitioning to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Rehnquist, 1987).
Justice Burger’s rise through the Republican Party continued when President Richard Nixon
nominated Burger for Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1969
(McLellan, 1996). President Nixon nominated Warren Burger in fulfillment of his campaign
promise to reverse Warren court precedent (Tobias, 1996).
Caselaw Context
The Rhode Island statute was enacted in 1969 and the Pennsylvania statute was
established in 1968. While the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island Statutes are bundled, there are
distinct differences between them. In an attempt to improve the educational experience of
students in nonpublic secular schools, the Statute allowed for state officials to supplement
salaries of teachers at nonpublic schools by a maximum of 15%, so long as their annual salary
did not exceed that of a public school teacher (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971). The following criteria
were requirements for teachers to receive the salary supplement:
•

The teacher works at a nonpublic school.

•

School financial documents are reviewed.

•

Teachers must only teach subjects offered in public schools, using the same materials
public school teachers use.

•

Cannot teach a course in religion.
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Similarly, Pennsylvania’s statute, the Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (1968) was enacted with the intention of addressing the financial deficit facing
nonpublic secular schools. The act was originally funded by a tax on horse racing before
transitioning to a funding source generated by cigarette tax (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971).
Caselaw Text
The Court heard oral arguments in Lemon on March 3, 1971 and rendered judgement on
June 28, 1971. Following the facts of the case, Justice Burger transitioned into isolated
statements on both the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes. Addressing the Rhode Island
statute, the Court echoed the ruling of the lower court. Strengthening the First Amendment, the
Court held, “we cannot ignore here the danger that pervasive modern governmental power will
ultimately intrude and religion and thus conflict with the Religion Clauses” (Lemon v. Kurtzman,
1971).
Specific to the Pennsylvania statute, “the State directly reimburses nonpublic schools
solely for their actual expenditures for teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials”
(Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971). In comparison to Rhode Island, the Court found the Pennsylvania
statute “has the further defect of providing state financial aid directly to the church-related
school” and “creates an intimate and continuing relationship between church and state” (Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 1971).
After an overview of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes, Justice Burger quickly
moved to precedent set by Black in Everson. Recognizing the delicacy of the subject at hand,
Justice Burger stated, “Candor compels acknowledgement, moreover, that we can only dimly
perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law”
(Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971).
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Justice Burger highlighted that although review of the legislative procedures did not
reveal an intent to advance religion. However, “the statutes themselves clearly state that they are
intended to enhance the quality of secular education in all schools” (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971).
Recognizing that church and state are not parallel and free of intersection, Justice Burger
highlighted that “prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total
separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and
religious organizations is inevitable” (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971). In many instances, this is
evidenced by federal and state agencies providing services for religious institutions (e.g., police,
fire, mail, etc.). Justice Burger furthered his ideology by delving into the visual metaphor of the
wall of separation. Highlighting the permeability of the wall of separation, Justice Burger argued
“Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being
a “wall,” is blurred, indistinct, and a variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a
particular relationship” (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971).
Justice Burger then transitioned to providing a more thorough explanation of the Court’s
opinion on the Rhode Island statute. Although restrictions were put in place to help ensure
neutrality…
We do not assume, however, that parochial schoolteachers will be unsuccessful in their
attempts to segregate their religious beliefs from their secular educational responsibilities.
But the potential for impermissible fostering of religion is present. The Rhode Island
Legislature has not, and could not, provide state aid on the basis of a mere assumption
that secular teachers under religious discipline can avoid conflicts. (Lemon v. Kurtzman,
1971)
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Closing a majority opinion consistent with strict separationist theory, Chief Justice
Burger argued,
Under our system the choice has been made that government is to be entirely excluded
from the area of religious instruction and churches excluded from the affairs of
government. The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the
individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while some
involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn. (Lemon v. Kurtzman,
1971)
Caselaw Consequences
Of particular significance, the Lemon Test was derived in light of the Court’s opinion. The
Lemon Test, used to assess the constitutionality of statutes, is comprised of three components:
1. It must not have a secular legislative purpose.
2. It must not advance or inhibit the existence of religion.
3. It must not “foster excessive entanglement with religion” (Walz v. Tax Commission of the
City of New York, 1970).
In his authorship of the majority opinion, Justice Burger was joined by Hugo Black. A
careful read of Lemon reveals judicial ideologies that parallel those of Justice Black’s
Everson. As is evidenced in Mueller v. Allen (1982), application and interpretation of the
Lemon test contributes to the permeability of the wall of separation between church and state.
While Lemon proved to be highly referenced framework for ruling on Establishment Clause
cases, the elements of the test are subjective and require the ideological lens of the judiciary
(Flowers, 2005).
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Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, (1982)
The state of Minnesota allows for taxpayers to deduct a portion of the expenses accrued
from educating their children. In accordance with state law, Minn. Stat. §§ 120.06, 120.72
(1982), deductions can be made in the areas of “tuition, textbooks, and transportation” (Mueller
v. Allen, 1982). Parents who elected to send their children to parochial school were also
permitted to receive the tax deduction. Petitioners argue the tax deduction violated the
Establishment Clause by advancing religion through the use of public funds (Mueller v. Allen,
1982). In a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Rehnquist, the court held the tax deduction program
did not have “the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of the nonpublic schools”
(Mueller v. Allen, 1982). Relying on precedent set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court
found no Establishment Clause violation.
Authorship and Audience
William Rehnquist was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on October 1st, 1924. As Schmidt
(2014) recounts, Justice Rehnquist grew up in an “anti-New Deal Republican” family (p. 275).
Firm in his conservative, Republican beliefs, Rehnquist enrolled in Kenyon College in Gambier,
Ohio (Schmidt, 2014). Rehnquist’s academic endeavors were interrupted when, after one
semester at Kenyon, he enlisted in the United States Army. Upon returning home in 1946,
Rehnquist attended Stanford University while working part time and receiving academic aid
through the G.I. Bill (Schmidt, 2014).
In 1969 he was appointed to the position of Assistant Attorney General in the Office of
Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice (Riggs & Proffitt, 1983). In October of 1971
Nixon nominated Rehnquist for his position on the Supreme Court of the United States. Nearly
two months later, Rehnquist was confirmed with a Senate vote of 68-26.
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In review of each case participated in by Justice Rehnquist, David Shapiro (1976)
identified three categories reflecting the Justice’s ideology. The categories are as follows,
1. Conflicts between an individual and the government should, whenever possible, be
resolved against the individual;
2. Conflicts between state and federal authority, whether on an executive, legislative or
judicial level, should, whenever possible, be resolved in favor of the states; and
3. Questions of the exercise of federal jurisdiction, whether on the district court, appellate
court, or Supreme Court level, should, whenever possible, be resolved against such
exercise. (Shapiro, 1976, p. 294)
Caselaw Context
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found no constitutional
violation. Specifically, the lower court positioned the tax deduction implemented by the state of
Minnesota as a generally available benefit to all taxpayers. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case in light of a conflicting opinions from the Courts of Appeals for the First and Eighth
Circuits. To aid the Court in objectively navigating opposing lower court decisions, Mueller was
decided using the aforementioned Lemon test derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971).
Caselaw Text
Similar to Justice Burger recognizing the delicacy of Lemon, Justice Rehnquist framed
the ideology of the Court stating, “It is not at all easy… to apply this Court’s various decisions
construing the Clause to governmental programs of financial assistance to sectarian schools and
the parents of children attending those schools” (Mueller v. Allen, 1982).
A State's decision to defray the cost of educational expenses incurred by parents —
regardless of the type of schools their children attend — evidences a purpose that is both
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secular and understandable. An educated populace is essential to the political and
economic health of any community, and a State's efforts to assist parents in meeting the
rising cost of educational expenses plainly serves this secular purpose of ensuring that the
State's citizenry is well educated. (Mueller v. Allen, 1982)
Justice Rehnquist made many references to Lemon and specifically stated the
“justifications are readily available to support §§ 120.06, subd. 22, and each is sufficient to
satisfy the secular purpose of Lemon” (Mueller v. Allen, 1982). It is clear that Lemon remained as
standard legal precedent.
In addressing the components of Lemon, Justice Rehnquist wrote specifically on the
state-wide access and application of the deduction, regardless of the educational setting. In
highlighting this point, Justice Rehnquist argued, “Most importantly, the deduction is available
for educational expenses incurred by all parents, including those whose children attend public
schools and those children attend nonsectarian private schools or sectarian private schools”
(Mueller v. Allen, 1982). Justice Rehnquist then moved into defending the Court’s opinion that
there is no Establishment Clause violation by stating,
The Establishment Clause of course extends beyond prohibition of a state church or
payment of state funds to one or more churches. We do not think, however, that its
prohibition extends to the type of tax deduction established by Minnesota. The historic
purposes of the Clause simply do not encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit,
ultimately controlled by the private choices of individual parents, that eventually flows to
parochial schools from the neutrally available tax benefit at issue in this case. (Mueller v.
Allen, 1982).
In closing, Justice Rehnquist reasoned,
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Making decisions such as this does not differ substantially from making the types of
decisions approved in earlier opinions of this Court. In Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U. S. 236 (1968), for example, the Court upheld the loan of secular textbooks to parents
or children attending nonpublic schools; though state officials were required to determine
whether particular books were or were not secular, the system was held not to violate the
Establishment Clause. The same result follows in this case. (Mueller v. Allen, 1982)
Caselaw Consequences
The Minnesota law affording taxpayers the opportunity to deduct education related
expenses from their state income tax, even in instances of private, parochial schools, did not
violate the Establishment Clause. Echoing Everson, the Court held that a generally available
benefit with the intent of aiding the individual, not a religious institution, is constitutional. The
Court did, however, recognize the deduction could not be used for a deduction of educational
materials specific to a religious doctrine. Addressing this point, the Court stated, “state officials
must disallow deductions taken for ‘instructional books and materials used in the teaching of
religious tenets, doctrines of worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines
or worship’” (Mueller v. Allen, 1982).
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, (1985)
In question is New York City’s use of Title 1 funds under the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA) of 1965. Under ESEA guidance, the state of New York allowed parochial
schools to serve as beneficiaries of Title 1 funds. Petitioners argue this practice violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Specifically, petitioners contend that using Title 1
appropriations to fund salaries of employees in parochial schools violates the Establishment
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Clause of the First Amendment. In a 5-4 majority, the Court found the New York Title 1
allocation to be unconstitutional.
Authorship and Audience
Justice William J. Brennan was born in Newark, New Jersey in 1906. After graduating
from Harvard Law School and serving in the military during World War II, Justice Brennan was
nominated for a position on the New Jersey Supreme Court (Marion, 1997). In 1956, former
President Nixon nominated William Brennan to the Supreme Court of the United States
(Wermiel, 1998). Throughout his thirty-four years on the Court, Justice Brennan routinely
incorporated human dignity in his opinions (Wermiel, 1998).
Caselaw Context
In order to qualify for Title 1 funding in New York, statutory law required the following criteria:
•

Children being served are educationally deprived.

•

Children live in an area of low income.

•

Title 1 funds are used in addition to generally available educational services. (Aguilar v.
Felton, 1985)

Any school meeting the aforementioned criteria was eligible to apply for funding, inclusive
of parochial schools. Parochial schools that meet the criteria were able to partner with public
school teachers who provided assistance with core academic subjects. Title 1 funds were used to
supplement the salaries of public school teachers that provided academic services for parochial
schools. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found paying public school personnel to
provide services in parochial schools to be unconstitutional.
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Caselaw Text
In his opening statements, Justice Brennan made clear the dangers of entanglement
between government and religious entities. He argued that a favorable act by the government
toward religion, in turn threatens the ideals and beliefs of individuals that do not ascribe to that
specific faith. Outlining the pitfalls of entanglement, Justice Brennan contended,
The principle that the state should not become too closely entangled with the church in
the administration of assistance is rooted in two concerns. When the state becomes
enmeshed with a given denomination in matters of religious significance, the freedom of
religious belief of those who are not adherents of that denomination suffers, even when
the governmental purpose underlying the involvement is largely secular. In addition, the
freedom of even the adherents of the denomination is limited by government intrusion
into sacred matters. (Aguilar v. Felton, 1985)
As Justice Brennan continued, he highlighted that while systems are in place to ensure
the academic offerings remain secular, the current policies “require a permanent and pervasive
state presence in the sectarian schools receiving aid” (Aguilar v. Felton, 1985). The Court
concluded that assigning a state official to a position of this capacity fostered entanglement and
clearly violated the Establishment Clause. Articulating this viewpoint, Justice Brennan wrote,
In short, the religious school, which has as a primary purpose the advancement and
preservation of a particular religion must endure the ongoing presence of state personnel
whose primary purpose is to monitor teachers and students in an attempt to guard against
the infiltration of religious thought. (Aguilar v. Felton, 1985)
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In closing, the Court recognized that while the primary effect of the program was to assist
students, it also created entanglement between a government agency and religiously affiliated
schools. Using separatist ideology, Justice Brennan argued,
Despite the well-intentioned efforts taken by the City of New York, the program remains
constitutionally flawed owing to the nature of the aid, to the institution receiving the aid,
and to the constitutional principles that they implicate — that neither the State nor
Federal Government shall promote or hinder a particular faith or faith generally through
the advancement of benefits or through the excessive entanglement of church and state in
the administration of those benefits. (Aguilar v. Felton, 1985)
Caselaw Consequences
Aguilar stands as yet another example of separationism informing judicial ideology.
Similar to Lemon, the Court reinforced that funding which directly benefits religious education
institutions is unconstitutional, even in instances where the benefit is secular in intent. In
response to Aguilar, the state of New York ceased the use of Title 1 funds to pay public school
teachers providing support and services to students on parochial school grounds. Accordingly,
New York implemented systems in which such services were provided in secular locations away
from the campuses of religious schools.
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)
Agostini was brought to the Court in light of the Aguilar v. Felton (1985) decision nearly
12 years earlier (Agostini v. Felton, 1997). At issue in both cases is the constitutionality of
utilizing public funds to pay salaries for teachers in parochial schools (Aguilar v. Felton, 1985).
In Aguilar, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that using public funds for
parochial schoolteachers’ salaries violates the Establishment Clause of First Amendment of the
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United States Constitution (Aguilar v. Felton, 1985). In 1997, the Court revisited this issue in
Agostini and ultimately reversed their opinion in Aguilar (Agostini v. Felton, 1997). Writing for
the majority, Justice O’Connor stated, “Not all entanglements, of course, have the effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion” and “We agree with petitioners that Aguilar is not consistent
with our subsequent Establishment Clause” (Agostini v. Felton, 1997).
Authorship and Audience
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, one of Aguilar’s staunchest dissenters, authored the
majority opinion in Agostini v. Felton (1997). In 1930, Justice O’Connor was born to a family of
ranchers in Texas (Sullivan, 2006). Her journey into a career in law was fraught with sex
discrimination. After working in a local prosecutor’s office, she and her husband opened a law
firm in Phoenix, Arizona (Sullivan, 2006). Appointed in 1981, Justice O’Connor holds the
distinction of being the first female Supreme Court justice.
Caselaw Context
The significance of Agostini is that it reconsiders the constitutionality of public school
teachers providing services for students in parochial schools. A question initially raised in
Aguilar v. Felton (1985) in which the Court affirmed clearly violated the Establishment Clause.
In response to Aguilar, “the District Court for the Eastern District of New York entered a
permanent injunction” (Agostini v. Felton, 1997). As in many cases before it, Agostini referenced
Establishment Clause violation criteria set forth in Lemon. However, in its application of the
Lemon test, the Court did not consider the third prong of entanglement.
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Caselaw Text
In Agostini, the Court once again was reliant on precedent set forth in Lemon.
Justice O’Connor expressly stated the Court has “abandoned the presumption…that the
placement of public employees on parochial school grounds inevitably results in the
impermissible effect of state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between
government and religion” (Agostini v. Felton, 1997).
Additionally, Justice O’Connor argued the Court “departed from the rule relied on in Ball
that all government aid that directly assists the educational function of religious schools is
invalid” (Agostini v. Felton, 1997). She continued, highlighting that location of academic
services should not be solely relied upon to indicate religious coercion. Public school teachers
providing instruction in the classrooms of parochial schools does not inherently advance religion.
In articulating this point, Justice O’Connor stated,
We do not see any perceptible (let alone dispositive) difference in the degree of symbolic
union between a student receiving remedial instruction in a classroom on his sectarian
school's campus and one receiving instruction in a van parked just at the school's
curbside. (Agostini v. Felton, 1997).
Justice O’Connor also argued that new York’s allocation of Title 1 funds is kin to
accommodations set forth in the Individuals with Disabilities Act. She contested that “In all
relevant respects, the provision of instructional services under Title I is indistinguishable from
the provision of sign-language interpreters under the IDEA. Both programs make aid available
only to eligible recipients” (Agostini v. Felton, 1997).
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Finding further fault with Aguilar, Justice O’Connor revisited the belief that location has
no bearing on the constitutional permissiveness of providing academic services. In summary of
this point, she stated,
What is most fatal to the argument that New York City's Title I program directly
subsidizes religion is that it applies with equal force when those services are provided off
campus, and Aguilar implied that providing the services off campus is entirely consistent
with the Establishment Clause. (Agostini v. Felton, 1997).
The majority opinion, penned by Justice O’Connor determined the Court erred in the Aguilar
decision. In closing, Justice O’Connor expressed discontent with Aguilar, viewing it as an
unnecessary barrier inhibiting disadvantaged students from accessing support and services. In
summation of this point, Justice O’Connor stated,
Indeed, under these circumstances, it would be particularly inequitable for us to bide our
time waiting for another case to arise while the city of New York labors under a
continuing injunction forcing it to spend millions of dollars on mobile instructional units
and leased sites when it could instead be spending that money to give economically
disadvantaged children a better chance at success in life by means of a program that is
perfectly consistent with the Establishment Clause. (Agostini v. Felton, 1997).
Caselaw Consequences
Agostini effectively reversed Aguilar by allowing for public school employees to be
compensated for services provided in private schools. Arguments in this case were built on the
premise that not all transactions between church and state directly advance religion. Critical to
this decision, the Court did not advocate for direct funding for private schools. The Court made
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it clear their opinion does not grant religious schools the opportunity to receive direct public
support (Wood & Petko, 2000).
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)
In Mitchell v. Helms (2000), the Court was tasked with determining if Chapter 2 of the
Education and Consolidation Improvement Act of 1981 violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Under Chapter 2, local government agencies
received federal funds and used them to provide educational materials and equipment for public
and private schools (Mitchell v. Helms, 2000). Respondents view private schools receiving
public assistance as an Establishment Clause violation. In a 6-3 plurality decision, the Court held
that Chapter 2 of the Education and Consolidation Improvement Act of 1981 does not violate the
Establishment Clause (Mitchell v. Helms, 2000).
Authorship and Audience
Justice Clarence Thomas served as the author of Mitchell v. Helms (2000). Born in 1948,
Justice Thomas was raised by his maternal grandparents in Pin Point, Georgia (Gerber, 2011). A
Harvard graduate with a conservative leaning, Justice Thomas work for U.S. Senator John C.
Danfroth, a Republican from Missouri (Gerber, 2011). Nearly seven years later, in 1986 Justice
Thomas was appointed to the position of assistant secretary for civil rights in the U.S.
department of Education by former President Ronald Reagan (Gerber, 2011). Five years later,
following the retirement of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice Thomas was nominated to the
U.S. Supreme Court by former President George Bush (Overby, et al., 1992).
Caselaw context.
Mitchell endured a 15 year battle in the judicial system. In 1985, respondents alleged,
“among other things, that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, violated the Establishment
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Clause of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution” (Mitchell v. Helms, 2000). Citing
judicial precedent set in Lemon, the District Court for the Eastern District “issued an order
permanently excluding pervasively sectarian schools in Jefferson Parrish from receiving any
Chapter 2 materials or equipment” (Mitchell v. Helms, 2000). On appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit ruled Ch. 2 unconstitutional.
Caselaw Text
In Mitchell, the Court heavily relied upon precedent set in Agostini. In framing this case,
Justice Thomas argued,
Like the provision at issue in Agostini, Chapter 2 channels federal funds to local
educational agencies (LEA's), which are usually public school districts, via state
educational agencies (SEA's), to implement programs to assist children in elementary and
secondary schools. (Mitchell v. Helms, 2000)
Justice Thomas continued, arguing the majority found no Establishment Clause violation. After a
brief summation of the facts of the case, Justice Thomas opined,
Considering Chapter 2 in light of our more recent caselaw, we conclude that it neither
results in religious indoctrination by the government nor defines its recipients by
reference to religion. We therefore hold that Chapter 2 is not a "law respecting an
establishment of religion." (Mitchell v. Helms, 2000)
The majority opinion relied heavily on the principle of neutrality. In his explanation of
how the principle of neutrality affects this case, Justice Thomas wrote,
In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the State and indoctrination
that is not, we have consistently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is
offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their religion. If the
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religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one
would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been
done at the behest of the government. (Mitchell v. Helms, 2000)
Addressing the exclusion of religious institutions from generally available programs,
Justice Thomas articulated, “hostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful
pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow” (Mitchell v. Helms, 2000).
Affirming the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Justice Thomas closed stating,
Accordingly, we hold that Chapter 2 is not a law respecting an establishment of religion.
Jefferson Parish need not exclude religious schools from its Chapter 2 program. To the
extent that Meek and Wolman conflict with this holding, we overrule them. (Mitchell v.
Helms, 2000)
Caselaw Consequences
In Mitchell, the Court held that religious institutions may benefit from secular,
nonideological educational materials, and Chapter 2 of the Education and Consolidation
Improvement Act of 1981 did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Ruling in favor of respondents, the Court heavily relied upon precedent set in Agostini. In
finding Chapter 2 constitutional, the Court’s majority highlighted neutrality as a guiding
principle in its decision. Arguing for neutrality, Justice Thomas stated, “we have consistently
turned to the principle of neutrality upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or
persons without regard to their religion” (Mitchell v. Helms, 2000). In analysis of the Court’s
basis of neutrality, Davis (2002) posited that “neutrality will reorder discrimination such that
those religious groups that are more willing to accept government aid will be subsidized to a
greater degree than those groups that are less willing to accept aid” (p. 1067).
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Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002)
In Zelman, the Court took up the issue of an Ohio school voucher program that
respondents argue is in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution. In light of low academic performance the state of Ohio enacted the
Pilot Project Scholarship Program which provides financial assistance for families to attend a
school of their choice as well as aid tutorial aid for students (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002).
The Pilot Program allowed parents to select religious education institutions. Respondents claim
that families utilizing public funds to attend religious schools violates the First Amendment
(Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002). In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that Ohio’s voucher
program does not violate the Establishment Clause (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002).
Authorship and Audience
Justice Rehnquist, further described in Mueller, authored the majority opinion in Zelman.
Caselaw Context
The Court focused on addressing the Establishment Clause question of “whether Ohio is
coercing parents into sending their children to religious schools” (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
2002). The debate over school vouchers was not isolated to court rooms and judge’s chambers.
The campaigns of former president George W. Bush and presidential candidate Albert Gore took
a definiteive stance on school vouchers (Halstead, 2004). Specifically, the Bush campaign came
out in support of vouchers while the Gore campaign remained in staunch opposition (Halstead,
2004).
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Caselaw Text
Providing a glimpse into the judicial ideology and rationale behind the majority decision,
Justice Rehnquist contended,
As was true in those cases, the Ohio program is neutral in all respects toward religion. It
is part of a general and multifaceted undertaking by the State of Ohio to provide
educational opportunities to the children of a failed school district. It confers educational
assistance directly to a broad class of individuals defined without reference to religion, i.
e., any parent of a school-age child who resides in the Cleveland City School District.
The program permits the participation of all schools within the district, religious or
nonreligious. Adjacent public schools also may participate and have a financial incentive
to do so. Program benefits are available to participating families on neutral terms, with no
reference to religion. The only preference stated anywhere in the program is a preference
for low-income families, who receive greater assistance and are given priority for
admission at participating schools. (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002)
Specifically adresing the question of Establishment Cluase coercion, the Court held,
There also is no evidence that the program fails to provide genuine opportunities for
Cleveland parents to select secular educational options for their school-age children.
Cleveland schoolchildren enjoy a range of educational choices: They may remain in
public school as before, remain in public school with publicly funded tutoring aid, obtain
a scholarship and choose a religious school, obtain a scholarship and choose a
nonreligious private school, enroll in a community school, or enroll in a magnet school.
That 46 of the 56 private schools now participating in the program are religious schools
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does not condemn it as a violation of the Establishment Clause. (Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 2002)
In closing Justice Rehnquist positioned the Court’s opinion as a vehicle for ascertainig
educational choice. Writing in favor of a generally available benefit, he stated,
In sum, the Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It provides benefits
directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence
in a particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice
among options public and private, secular and religious. (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
2002)
The Court’s decision was made based on their interpretation of the Pilot Progam granting
families the opportunity to exercise “genuine choice” when making educational decisions
(Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002).
Caselaw Consequences
The Court’s decision in Zelman solidified the arguments of proponents of school choice.
Effectively, the Court held that “tuition vouchers to religious schools did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution” (Halmstead, 2004, p. 148). What the
Court did not specify, however, is the extent to which states are required to provide such a
program (Halmstead, 2004). Following the Zellman decision, parties in multiple states brought
forth litigation specific to school vouchers. Challenges were made to state constitutions and
petitioners drafted arguments in light of the majority opinion in Zellman.
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)
In Locke, the Court was tasked with determining if a state can deny a previously awarded
scholarship to a student who declares a major in theology. Joshua Davey, respondent, was
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awarded a Promise Scholarship through the state of Washington and sought to attend Northwest
College (Locke v. Davey, 2004). Although Northwestern is non-secular, it is still an allowable
institution so long as Davey declares a secular major. Davey intended on pursuing a double
major in pastoral ministries and business and was informed that he could not use state
scholarship funds when declaring a degree in theology (Locke v. Davey, 2004). Writing for the
majority, Justice Rehnquist argued, “Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue, we
therefore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is
inherently constitutionally suspect” (Locke v. Davey, 2004).
Authorship and Audience
Justice Rehnquist, further described in Mueller, authored the majority opinion in Locke.
Caselaw Context
Washington’s state funded scholarship outlined allowable use criteria and clearly outlined
that eligible students must attend an eligible school in Washington and “a student may not pursue
a degree in theology at that institution while receiving the scholarship” (Locke v. Davey, 2004).
While many cases before Locke were specific to Establishment Clause issues, petitioners argued
Washington’s denial of Davey is a Free Exercise Clause violation (Locke v. Davey, 2004). On
appeal from the District Court from the Western District, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit “declared Washington’s Promise Scholarship Program constitutional (Locke v.
Davey, 2004).
Caselaw Text
Referencing precedent furthered in Zelman, the Court contended, “This case involves that
"play in the joints" described above. Under our Establishment Clause precedent, the link between
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government funds and religious training is broken by the independent and private choice of
recipients” (Locke v. Davey, 2004).
The Court acknowledged the language within Washington’s Constitution was
exponentially stronger than that of the Establishment Clause. Embracing Washington’s
fortification of the Establishment Clause, Justice Rehnquist argued in favor of robust
constitutional language devoted to maintaining separation between church and state. In defense
of his position he stated,
Even though the differently worded Washington Constitution draws a more stringent line
than that drawn by the United States Constitution, the interest it seeks to further is
scarcely novel. In fact, we can think of few areas in which a State's antiestablishment
interests come more into play. Since the founding of our country, there have been popular
uprisings against procuring taxpayer funds to support church leaders, which was one of
the hallmarks of an "established" religion. (Locke v. Davey, 2004)
Closing the opinion and defending the position of the Court, Justice Rehnquist argued
that states are not required to fund religious instruction through state-sponsored scholarship aid.
Justice Rehnquist stated,
In short, we find neither in the history or text of Article I, § 11, of the Washington
Constitution, nor in the operation of the Promise Scholarship Program, anything that
suggests animus toward religion. Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue,
we therefore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious
instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect. (Locke v. Davey, 2004).
The opinion in Locke is uniquely specific to higher education. Justice Rehnquist
refrained from signaling the Court’s opinion was applicable to K-12 schools.
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Caselaw Consequences
As highlighted by Geier (2020), federal caselaw in Locke “strengthened the argument that
a state's restriction on appropriating public funding to religious organizations may be stricter than
federal interpretation” (p. 331). The cases referenced above provide a glimpse into the Supreme
Court of the United States’ position on school funding from mid 20th century to early 21st
century. From Everson v. Board (1947) to Locke v. Davey (2004) the Court has wavered on the
line of strict separation between church and state. The line drawn between what is
constitutionally permissible and impermissible is thin and blurred (Jeffries & Ryan, 2001). In a
review of each case, it is crucial to remain cognizant of the idea that law is a matter of specific
circumstance (Permuth, Mawdsley & Silver, 2015). This theme holds true for the cases of Trinity
and Espinoza, described in greater detail below.
Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 582 U.S.__ (2017).
Spanning a total of five years, the Trinity case began in Missouri in 2012 and was
ultimately decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2017. The Learning Center, a
non-secular pre-school affiliated with Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. applied for the
grant program but was denied on the basis of their religious affiliation. Penning the majority
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts argued that non-secular entities could not be denied participation
in neutral aid programs on the basis of their religious affiliation.
Authorship and Audience
Chief Justice John Roberts served as the author of the majority opinion in Trinity. After
graduating from Harvard law School, Chief Justice Roberts served as a clerk for federal level
judges, Henry Friendly and William Rehnquist (Pomerance, 2018). Following his clerkships,
Chief Justice Roberts, while working in the Justice Department, was commissioned by former
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Attorney General William French Smith to construct a legislative brief “supporting legislation
that would expressly strip the Supreme Court from appellate jurisdiction over abortion, prayer in
public schools, bussing” and other topics (Pomerance, 2018, p. 462). While Smith did not move
the brief forward, Chief Justice Roberts’ work was noted by former president Reagan’s
administration (Pomerance, 2018). Nominated for Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in
2005 by George W. Bush (Pomerance, 2019). Once confirmed, Roberts was recognized as the
youngest Chief Justice in nearly two centuries (Pomerance, 2019).
Caselaw Context
Controversy arose when Trinity Lutheran Child Learning Center applied for a state
playground resurfacing grant offered through Missouri’s Department of Natural Resources
(DNR). Although Trinity Lutheran’s application scored well, ranking fifth among 44 applicants,
it was denied in light of Article 1, Section 7 of Missouri’s Constitution, which stated, “no money
shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or
denomination of religion” (Missouri Const. art. I, pt. VII). The aforementioned language is
commonly recognized as Missouri’s Blaine Amendment.
Caselaw Text
On September 26, 2013 the Trinity case began its ascension through the court system
(Trinity Lutheran v. Pauley, 2013). Ruling in favor of Missouri’s DNR, the Federal District
Court found,
Trinity has not cited, and the Court's independent research has not revealed, a case
construing the Establishment Clause in the manner urged by Trinity. Accordingly, there
is no basis for concluding that Trinity is entitled to relief under the Establishment Clause
and this claim must be dismissed. (Trinity Lutheran v. Pauley, 2013)
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On appeal following dismissal in Missouri’s Central Division District Court, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision (Trinity Lutheran v. Pauley, 2015). The
Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear the case and issued a writ of certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
In a 7-2 decision favoring Trinity Lutheran, the Court found that excluding organizations
with religious identities from secular aid programs strictly because they are religious violates the
free exercise clause of the First Amendment. The judgement rendered by the Court of Appeals
was reversed and the case was remanded (Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 2017). Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Roberts argued,
The state has pursued its preferred policy to the point of expressly denying a qualified
religious entity a public benefit solely because of its religious character. Under our
precedents, that goes too far. The Department’s policy violates the Free Exercise Clause.
(Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 2017).
Arguing against discrimination based on religious identity, Justice Roberts closed his argument
stating, “the exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from a public benefit for which it is otherwise
qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution all the same, and cannot
stand” (Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 2017).
While six other justices joined Justice Roberts in the majority opinion, two of the six did
not join in footnote three. Footnote three states, “This case involves express discrimination based
on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of
funding or other forms of discrimination” (Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 2017). Justice Gorsuch
and Justice Thomas refrained from joining in footnote three and expressed their concern in their
concurring opinions. Although they found footnote three to be “entirely correct,” they worried
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the footnote suggests the Court’s ruling should only be applied in issues of child health or safety
(Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 2017). Instead, they argued, “the general principles here do not
permit discrimination against religious exercise – whether on the playground or anywhere else”
(Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 2017).
Two justices, Justice Sotomayor and Justice Ginsburg, refrained from joining the
majority opinion. Embedded within their dissent they referenced Mitchell, Zelman, and Locke as
precedent and argued for maintaining a strict separation between church and state (Trinity
Lutheran v. Comer, 2019). Holding the position that the majority opinion was made in error,
Justice Sotomayor, the author of the dissent, stated, “This Court has repeatedly warned that
funding of exactly this kind — payments from the government to a house of worship — would
cross the line drawn by the Establishment Clause” (Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 2017). Justice
Sotomayor continued by expressing firm disbelief that allowing Trinity Lutheran to receive
public aid would not serve as a religious advancement. She argued, “The Church's playground
surface — like a Sunday School room's walls or the sanctuary's pews — are integrated with and
integral to its religious mission. The conclusion that the funding the Church seeks would
impermissibly advance religion is inescapable” (Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 2017).
Caselaw Consequences
Nearly 72 years later, the Court’s decision in Trinity Lutheran v. Comer (2017) echoed
portions of the Everson v. Board (1947) opinion. Undoubtedly, the Trinity ruling has expanded
the extent to which religious institutions can receive direct public aid. In a speech given by
David Cortman (2017), the attorney representing Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning
Center, he argued “The Court has never held that direct funding to a church or religious
organization violates the establishment clause.” The Court’s decision echoes Cortman’s (2017)
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sentiment and sheds light on the direction of the judiciary. Discussing the implications of Trinity,
Russo and Thro (2017), highlighted that “faith-based institutions cannot be denied aid simply
because of their religious characters” (p. 254). Additionally, Russo and Thro (2017) reasoned
that “supporters of school choice initiatives, and other forms of aid, can be expected to test the
reach of Trinity Lutheran” (p. 255).
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 591 U.S.__ (2020)
The Montana legislature tasked the Montana Department of Revenue with implementing
a “dollar-for-dollar tax credit” contingent on donations made to a Student Scholarship
Organization (SSO) (Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 2020). SSOs are but one
funding source for “children who attend private schools meeting the definition of Qualified
Education Provider (QEP)” (Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 2020). Plaintiffs are
identified as parents of students enrolled in religious schools. In a 5-4 decision authored by Chief
Justice Roberts, the Court held, “A State need not subsidize private education. But once a State
decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious”
(Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 2020).
Authorship and Audience
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.
Caselaw Context
Following the directive of the state, the Montana Department of Revenue enacted the Tax
Credit Program. In accordance with Montana’s state constitution, the department also felt it
necessary to institute Rule 1, which “excluded religiously-affiliated private schools from
qualifying as QEPs” (Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 2020).
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The Montana Supreme Court addressed the specific question, “Does the Tax Credit
Program Violate Article X, Section 6, of the Montana Constitution” (Espinoza v. Montana
Department of Revenue, 2020). The court found that the Tax Credit Program violates the
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court and on June 28th, 2019 the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear the case and
oral argument occurred on June 30th, 2020.
Caselaw Text
Chief Justice Roberts opened the majority opinion reciting the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment and highlighted the “play in the joints” expression used in Locke and Trinity to
metaphorically depict the theoretical space between each Religion Clause. He continued, citing
much of the judicial ideology expressed in Trinity, specifically advancing the belief that
“disqualifying otherwise eligible recipients from a public benefit ‘solely because of their
religious character’ imposes ‘a penalty on the free exercise of religion that triggers the most
exacting scrutiny’” Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020).
In addressing the legal challenge at hand, Chief Justice Roberts introduced the issue,
stating,
The question for this Court is whether the Free Exercise Clause precluded the Montana
Supreme Court from applying Montana's no-aid provision to bar religious schools from
the scholarship program. For purposes of answering that question, we accept the Montana
Supreme Court's interpretation of state law—including its determination that the
scholarship program provided impermissible "aid" within the meaning of the Montana
Constitution —and we assess whether excluding religious schools and affected families
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from that program was consistent with the Federal Constitution. Espinoza v. (Montana
Department of Revenue, 2020)
Seeking distinction from judicial ideology employed in Locke, Chief Justice Roberts
argued two significant differences. To begin, he noted Locke, explained “that Washington had
‘merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction’: the ‘essentially religions endeavor’
of training a minister ‘to lead a congregation’” (Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue,
2020). Additionally, he contested that Locke “invoked a ‘historic and substantial’ state interest in
not funding the training of clergy” (Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 2020).
In further defense of the position of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts argued,
Furthermore, we do not see how the no-aid provision promotes religious freedom. As
noted, this Court has repeatedly upheld government programs that spend taxpayer funds
on equal aid to religious observers and organizations, particularly when the link between
government and religion is attenuated by private choices. (Espinoza v. Montana
Department of Revenue, 2020)
In closing, Chief Justice Roberts argued, “the prohibition before us today burdens not
only religious schools but also the families whose children attend or hope to attend them”
(Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 2020). Ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the Montana Supreme Court Decision and remanded it for
further consideration.
Caselaw Consequences
Espinoza had the primary intent of advancing accommodationist ideology and
maintaining judicial precedent specific to neutral treatment of secular and religious educational
institutions eligibility for generally available public aid. In the closing paragraph of the majority
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opinion, Chief Justice Roberts scolds the Montana Supreme Court for their rationale and decision
in Espinoza, citing neglect of the Supremacy Clause which directs “state courts that they ‘must
not give effect to state laws that conflict with federal law’” (Espinoza v. Montana Department of
Revenue, 2020). The closing paragraph reads as a reminder from parent to child of the rules and
expectations within a household. Table 4.2 Serves as a summary of the findings of this study.
Waves of Religion and Public Schools Litigation
Interpretation of data revealed the presence of two primary waves of religion and public
schools litigation. Distinction between the two waves is specific to the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause. The first wave, spanning from 1947-2003, embodies two distinct eras.
In the first era of Establishment Clause litigation, the Court promoted strict separation between
church and state. In the second era, the Court lessened its restrictions and relaxed “its attitude
toward the use of state funds for private schools” (McCarthy, 1981). The second identified wave
is marked by litigation specific to the Free Exercise Clause. In ruling on issues specific to the
Free Exercise Clause, the Court has demonstrated further accommodation for religion and
viewed many applications of strict separation as discriminatory.
First Wave
The first identifiable wave is exclusive to litigation citing Establishment Clause
violations. In the first era of this wave, petitioners alleged First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause violations and spanned from 1947-1996. While judicial ideology conveyed in Everson is
present throughout many of this era’s cases, precedent set in Lemon proved to have a significant
impact on future cases. Specifically, strict separation theory was championed early in this wave
and had a significant impact for nearly 50 years. Cases during this era reflected “the notion that
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Table 4.2
Summary of Findings
Case

Authorship

Position/Bias

Ideology

Everson v.
Board of
Education,
1947

Hugo Black

Protection
against
establishing
religion.

Strict separation
of church and
state.

Lemon v.
Kurtzman,
1971

Warren Burger

Protection
against
establishing
religion.

Strict separation
of church and
state.

Mueller v.
Allen,
1982

William
H. Rehnquist

Accommodation Reliant on criteria
of religious
established in
institutions.
Lemon.

Key Element of Intended Impact
Potential
Opinion
Consequence
Transportation
Reimbursement
Strict separation
reimbursement
for transportation lens utilized
is a generally
is
when
available
constitutionally
interpreting
benefit.
permissible.
state
constitutional
provisions.
Publicly funding Three pronged test Strengthening of
parochial
(Lemon test)for
strict separation
schools
Establishment
principles.
violates the
Clause
Establishment
violations.
Clause.
Public aid
Education tax
Strict separation
directed at
credits for
begins to
students and
families who’s
weaken.
families
child attends a
enrolled in
parochial school
parochial
are
schools is
constitutional.
constitutional.
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Table 4.2 (Continued)
Case

Authorship

Position/Bias

Ideology

Aguilar v.
Felton,
1985

William
Brennan

Protection
against
establishing
religion.

Any aid from the
State or Federal
government to a
religious school
creates
entanglement.

Agostini v.
Felton,
1997

Sandra Day
O’Connor

Accommodation State aid for
of religious
secular
institutions.
instruction does
not advance
religion.

Mitchell v.
Helms,
2000

Clarence
Thomas

Accommodation Principle of
of religious
neutrality.
institutions.

Zelman v.
SimmonsHarris,
2002

William H.
Rehnquist

Accommodation Initiatives that
of religious
allow families
institutions.
to exercise
choice are
neutral and do
not advance
religion.

Key Element of
Opinion
Public funds
may not be
used to pay
salaries of
parochial
school
teachers.
Secular aid for
religious
schools that
does not
advance
religion is
constitutional.
Providing
secular
academic
materials for
parochial
schools does
not advance
religion.
Voucher
programs do
not violate the
Establishment
Clause.

Intended Impact
Dissolve any
entanglement
between the state
and religious
schools.

Potential
Consequence
All forms of aid
for religious
institutions is
unconstitutional.

Reversal of
Aguilar.

The Court is
more tolerant of
parochial
schools utilizing
public funds for
non-religious
expenses.
Publicly funding
Expansion of
secular
constitutionally
educational
permissible
materials for
instances in
parochial schools which parochial
is constitutional.
schools benefit
from public aid.
Tuition vouchers
Further litigation
do not violate the on tuition
Establishment
vouchers as the
Clause.
Court did not
specify
constitutional
limits.
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Table 4.2 (Continued)
Case
Locke v.
Davey,
2004

Authorship
William H.
Rehnquist

Trinity
John G.
Lutheran v.
Roberts
Comer,
2017
Espinoza v.
Montana,
2020

John G.
Roberts

Position/Bias
Defined a limit
of the Free
Exercise
Clause.

Ideology
State provisions
specific to
publicly funding
religious
institutions may
be stronger than
federal law.

Key Element of Intended Impact
Potential
Opinion
Consequence
Scholarships
Protection of state Defined limits of
intended to
antiestablishment the Free
fund secular
legislation that is
Exercise Clause.
instruction are
stricter than
not required to
federal law.
fund secular
instruction.

Accommodation Strict separation is Exclusion of
Churches may not Strict separation
of religious
discriminatory
churches from
be excluded from efforts are
institutions.
in effect.
generally
public programs
discriminatory.
available aid
based on their
programs is
religious
discriminatory.
affiliation.
Accommodation Strict separation is Religious
Increase
Strict separation
of religious
discriminatory
institutions
accommodation
efforts are
institutions.
in effect.
may not be
of religion
discriminatory;
excluded from
across all
increased
generally
generally
accommodation
available aid
available
for religious
programs.
programs.
schools.
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Court’s job was to protect vulnerable minorities from tyrannical majorities” (Epstein & Posner,
2021, p.4). Although Lemon provided the Court with a framework for interpreting Establishing
Clause cases, its subjective nature did not account for variances in judicial ideology (Flowers,
2005).
Justice Black’s opinion in Everson encapsulates the judicial ideology relied upon for the
Court’s acceptance of strict separation theory. In defining the Establishment Clause, Justice
Black contended it means at least this,
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
Everson v. Board of Education (1947)
However, as Andrew Beerworth (2004) argued, strict separation “had already begun to chafe
under the yoke of twentieth century social reality” (p. 341).
The dismantling of strict separation is well documented in Mueller v. Allen (1982).
Judicial ideology relied upon in Everson began to fade as the Court signaled its willingness to
accept government funds going to religious schools (Flowers, 2005). Shifts in judicial ideology
established in Mueller championed the belief that government aid flowing “directly to the
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student rather than directly or indirectly to the school” is free from Establishment Clause
violation (Flowers, 2005, p. 87).
Additionally, the Mueller decision also marks the re-emergence of accommodationist
neutrality as an ideological lens adopted by the judiciary (Massaro, 2005). As Halstead (2004)
highlighted, strict separation relied upon in Everson began to weaken with Mueller. It is argued
the Rehnquist Court defended an accommodationist ideology as it broke ties with separationist
precedent set decades earlier.
Beginning with Agostini in 1997, judicial variances presented themselves in the second
era of the first wave. Although litigation remained specific to the arena of Establishment Clause
violations, judicial ideology went through a significant transformation. The second portion of the
wave signified a deviation from strict separation theory as the Court took a more tolerant
position on publicly funding public schools. The Court responded favorably for non-secular
schools receiving public funds to off-set the non-religious aspects of schooling. In comparison to
the strict separation wave, this wave of allowable funding for religious schools spanned from
1997-2000. The latter portion of this wave is most notably marked by the shift in judicial
ideology from Aguilar to Agostini. The transition between the cases is further witnessed by the
Court’s empathic opinions in favor of publicly funding various aspects of parochial schools.
Second Wave
The second and final wave identified in this study is specific to Free Exercise Clause
litigation and is delineated by Locke v. Davey (2004). Although Locke was not decided for
Davey, Duncan (2006) argued the Court previously recognized “generally applicable and nondiscriminatory scholarships and vouchers do not violate the Establishment Clause” (p. 704).
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The deviation from Establishment Clause litigation was coupled with a tremendous shift
in judicial ideology. Accordingly, utilization of the Establishment Clause’s litmus test, the
Lemon test, significantly diminished as well. Most recently with Trinity and Espinoza, the Court
found exclusion of parochial schools from public programs is, in effect, discriminatory.
Discrimination against religion is a central theme in both of the aforementioned cases and frames
the ideological underpinnings of the Court’s decisions.
Although analysis of the ten aforementioned cases led to the identification of two distinct
waves, the Court has viewed tax deduction and tax credit programs as constitutional, regardless
of litigation being specific to the Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause (Mueller v. Allen,
1982; Espinoza v. Montana, 2020).
Summary
The cases reviewed in this study revealed a dichotomous transition in litigation from the
Establishment Clause to the Free Exercise Clause. Additionally, from Everson to Espinoza,
judicial ideology has undergone significant transformations. Shifts in the interpretation of the
Religion Clauses are representative of the Court’s deviation from strict separation and adoption
of accommodationism. Figure 4.1 depicts a comparison of shifts in state Blaine Amendment
language and judicial ideology.
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Everson (1947)

State Blaine Amendment Language Classifications
Restrictive
(Kemerer, 1997)

Uncertain
(Kemerer, 1997)

Most Restrictive (DeForrest,
2003)

Narrow Restriction
(DeForrest, 2003)

Espinoza (2020)

Judicial Ideology

Strict Separation

Accomodation

Figure 4.1
Comparison of Shifts in State Blaine Amendment Language and Judicial Ideology
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CHAPTER FIVE:
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
This research reviewed multiple U.S. Supreme Court cases over a period of 73 years.
Constitutional issues were specific to the Religion Clauses embedded within the First
Amendment and addressed various school funding questions (e.g., transportation reimbursement,
teacher salaries, curriculum resources, tax credits, etc.). Judicial ideology specific to publicly
funding parochial schools has shifted over time and this study revealed the Court has grown
more tolerant of private, non-secular educational institutions receiving public funds for the
neutral aspects of education. In the early cases reviewed in this study, strict separation was not
widely viewed as an attack on religion. Judicial ideology used in Everson echoed throughout
subsequent Establishment Clauses cases. However, as membership shifts occurred on the Court,
judicial ideology of the majority moved towards accomodationism. This chapter explains
contributing factors behind the ideological shift as well as potential consequences for eliminating
separationist language from state constitutions.
Socio-political Influences
Analysis of each case led to the unveiling of socio-political factors that influence judicial
ideology. While judicial precedent serves as an influencing factor, research on judicial ideology
suggests factors beyond established caselaw effect the decision making of the Court (Epstein &
Posner, 2021). Justices lived experiences and belief systems play a significant role in developing
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the lens from which they view constitutional questions. Outlined below are the socio-political
influences of administrative power, religious beliefs, and discrimination against religion.
Administrative Power
Arguably, the most significant political factor is the nominating power of the President of
the United States while supported by the Senate. Former President Nixon confirmed four justices
during his five and a half year tenure as president. However, once confirmed, there are instances
in which the ideology of a justice deviates from predictions made by administrative and
legislative bodies. Although Nixon nominated Warren Burger as Chief Justice in an attempt to
reverse precedent, under Justice Burger’s leadership, the court “left intact, and even
consolidated, much Warren Court jurisprudence” (Tobias, 1996, p. 505).
Interestingly, former President Nixon is not the only president to have nominated
multiple Supreme Court justices during his presidency. Both former President Reagan and
former President Trump were also afforded the opportunity to nominate multiple justices during
the respective terms. Beginning in August of 1981, former President Reagan nominated Sandra
Day O’Connor to the Supreme Court. In the proceeding years, Reagan nominated, and congress
confirmed, William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy. Similarly, during his
presidency Trump nominated, and the congress confirmed, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and
Amy Coney Barrett. These instances in Supreme Court nominating history serve as critical
factors influencing the ideological principles of the Court.
Religious Beliefs
Once appointed to the Court, religious belief systems also influence judicial ideology,
and their effect is evident in Court opinions. Devout, conservative justices have a higher
probability of voting in favor of religion (Epstein & Posner, 2021). Further, not only is there a
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documented increase in pro-religion decisions, but the Court has also specifically seen an
increase in pro-mainstream Christian decisions (Epstein & Posner, 2021). Currently, six of the
nine U.S. Supreme Court justices identify as Catholic, five of which represent the conservative
majority (Epstein & Posner, 2021). While theological beliefs of the Court have shifted over time,
deeply held, monotheistic viewpoints encapsulate the majority. Although data indicated that
religious beliefs heavily influence the ideology of Supreme Court, Epstein and Posner (2021)
shared that less than 50% of Americans view religion as an important aspect of their life. In the
early years of our nation, religious beliefs were accepted as a primary factor influencing many
government systems. However, if society continues to deviate from once commonly held
monotheistic beliefs, the religious value systems of the Supreme Court majority may work
against local, state, and federal progressive reform efforts.
Discrimination Against Religion
Beginning with Trinity and continuing with Espinoza, the Court feverishly addressed
religious discrimination. Much of their adamancy can be attributed to the shift in litigation from
the Establishment Clause to the Free Exercise Clause. As stated by Chief Justice Roberts in
Trinity, “The express discrimination against religious exercise here is not the denial of a grant,
but rather the refusal to allow the Church — solely because it is a church — to compete with
secular organizations for a grant” (Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 2017). Welcoming
accommodationist ideology, the Court may elect to hear more cases involving alleged Free
Exercise Clause violations. Given the language used by Chief Justice Roberts in both Trinity and
Espinoza, it is quite clear the Court is poised to dismantle “any generally available benefit”
eligibility language that expressly discriminates between public and private educational
institutions (Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 2020).
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Potential Consequences
State Blaine Amendments have historically served as a robust barrier between public and
religious institutions. This barrier has safe-guarded public schools by funneling publicly acquired
funds into public schools and ensuring that private, parochial schools do not benefit from
government funds. However, recent decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court have lessened the
integrity of strict separation language. The cases of Trinity and Espinoza further denote the
Courts disassociation with strict separation. Given the potential longevity of the Court’s current
composition, the judicial ideologies established and promoted will likely tolerate greater
entanglement between religious schools and public aid. Trends in caselaw suggest the Court will
favor individuals over the state when ruling on Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause
cases. This is especially evident in the Court’s recent focus on combating religious
discrimination specific to the denial of religious organizations participation in generally available
programs (Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 2017; Espinoza v. Montana, 2020). As it relates to state
Blaine Amendments, the Court’s embracement of accommodationist ideology signals strict
separation amendments may soon crumble.
Funding Inequities
The elimination of Blaine Amendments may widen the already pervasive education
funding gaps. The Century Foundation (2020) estimates that U.S. K-12 public schools are
underfunded by $150 million. In light of this, extending public funding eligibility opportunities
to parochial schools may be detrimental to public school funding in the Unites States. The U.S.
Department of Education ranks Mississippi, Oklahoma, Arizona, Idaho, and Utah as the states
allocating the least amount of money per pupil (Hansen, 2020). Accordingly, each of the states
have adopted Blaine language into their state constitutions. Providing public funding for
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religiously affiliated schools in these states could potentially per-pupil funding and diminish the
educational experience for students who attend public schools.
Further, the elimination of constitutional provisions prohibiting direct or indirect funding
of religious institutions may broaden inequities in educational funding. In analysis of state
education funding with consideration of poverty levels, Morgan and Amerikaner (2018)
concluded that North Dakota, Florida, South Carolina, Montana, and Michigan spend the least
amount of money per pupil between districts serving the most and fewest students in poverty. In
review of each state constitution, all five states have constitutional language that can be
classified as a Blaine Amendment. Removal of Blaine language in these states will increase the
number of educational institutions eligible for public aid and may further decrease per-pupil
expenditures at the state level. Consequently, spreading an already thin state education budget
across a greater number of schools may negatively affect the educational outcomes of students
living in poverty who attended K-12 public schools.
To continue, poverty is not the only factor influencing the divide between public and
religions school enrollment. Racial compositions of religious schools have historically been
majority White. The National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) (2019) reported that 66%
of students attending Catholic schools were White, while only 8% were Black and 16% were
Hispanic. The breakdown of students attending other religious schools was quite similar; 71%
White, 10% Black and, 8% Hispanic (NCES, 2019). Considering each of the aforementioned
data points, it is reasonable to suggest that removal of strict separation language from state
constitutions may increase education access inequities between races. Further still, economic
inequities, compounded by racial inequities indicate that publicly funding religious schools will
negatively affect public schools serving a more diverse population.
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Permissible Language
With Blaine Amendment language differing significantly from state to state, it is unlikely
the Court would hold all separation language unconstitutional. Various classifications of Blaine
Amendments highlight variances in what each state allows and disallows (Kemerer, 1998;
DeFrorrest, 2003). With a shift towards accommodation, the Court may find state separationist
language, classified by Kemerer (1998) as restrictive, to be in violation of the Free Exercise
Clause. Strict language in California’s state constitution, for example, may be deemed
unconstitutional. Barring any form of religious aid, California’s Blaine Amendment states,
No public money shall ever be appropriated for the support of any sectarian or
denominational school, or any school not under the exclusive control of the officers of
the public schools; nor shall any sectarian or denominational doctrine be taught, or
instruction thereon be permitted, directly or indirectly, in any of the common schools of
this State. California Const. Art. IX, § 8
Prohibition of indirect aid may be an issue that courts address on a broader basis. Diluting
state Blaine Amendments to only prohibiting direct aid that establishes religion may be an initial
step of the Court. An example of this shift can be seen in Utah’s state Blaine language which
only prohibits direct aid. Utah’s state constitution states that, “Neither the state of Utah nor its
political subdivisions may make any appropriation for the direct support of any school or
educational institution controlled by any religious organization” (Utah Const. Art. X, § 9).
Religious Preference
Additionally, as identified by Epstein and Posner (2021), the Roberts court has the
highest percentage of pro-religion outcomes (81.3%). Data analysis revealed Court has firmly
ruled in favor of religious institutions in instances where indirect aid benefits the student and
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does not advance religious beliefs. This statistic may signal religious institutions and their
advocates to bring forth litigation that seeks to expand the use of public funds in private schools
by dismantling state Blaine Amendments.
Dilution of Religion Clauses
McCarthy (1981) articulated the danger and potential “erosion of constitutional
freedoms” as the Supreme Court grew accepting of governmental accommodation to religion (p.
394). Much of McCarthy’s (1981) foreshadowing of entanglement has been realized in in 21st
century caselaw. Dilution of the strict separation once championed by the Court may fracture the
structural integrity of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Specifically, U.S. Supreme
Court decisions that are sympathetic to the needs of religious schools and argue for increased
accommodation may diminish Establishment Clause violation criteria.
Suggestions for Future Research
Results of this study highlighted four prominent areas worthy of future research. Of
significance, Louisiana is the only state to date that has repealed its Blaine Amendment (Katz,
2011). Additionally, while this work identified factors influencing judicial ideology, it also
highlighted a desire to control the direction of the Court. The sculpting of the Court is heavily
influenced by the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. Although majority
opinions are recognized as the law of the land, there are many instances in which the ideology of
the dissent is adopted by a majority in future opinions (West Virginia v. Barnette, 1943; Aguilar
v. Felton, 1985). This work covered religious education funding cases spanning the leadership of
Chief Justices Vinson, Warren, Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts. Shifts in the Roberts Court have
been unprecedented and warrant further review.
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Louisiana’s Blaine Amendment – Repealed
To date, Louisiana stands as the only state to have repealed its state Blaine Amendment.
In 1973, the Louisiana constitution contained language barring publicly funding religious schools
(Katz, 2011). However, after a convening of the state constitutional convention, Louisiana
proceeded with removing its Blaine language and presented voters with two versions of the
education act, one with separation language and one without (Katz, 2011). Ultimately, a majority
of voters selected the education act without Blaine language (Katz, 2011). Specifically, what
events led to the repeal of Louisiana’s Blaine Amendment, and why haven’t other states
followed suit in the ensuing 48 years?
Sculpting of the Court
To begin, there is a need for further research on the executive, legislative, and judicial
sculpting of the Supreme Court of the United States. In addition to the administrative nominating
powers described above, the legislative and judicial branches play an influential role in seating a
potential justice. Allegiances between the president and their respective party quite frequently
influence the confirmation process. While the president controls the nomination, the United
States Senate is charged with confirming the nomination. Since Everson, the majority of U.S.
Supreme Court justices have been nominated by conservative presidents.
Additionally, spanning the caselaw explored in this work there have been multiple
Supreme Court nominees rejected by congress. These rejections raise questions around
influencing factors considered during the nominating process. Acknowledging the influence an
individual has over the ideology of the Court, what efforts are made to protect or dismantle the
ideology of the majority?
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Judicial Dissent
Further still, this research highlighted a need to conduct a review of the dissenting
opinions in the cases explained in this work. While this work is primarily focused on majority
opinions and their authorship, there is much to be gleaned from dissenting opinions written in
opposition to the majority. Specifically, additional research on tracking dissenting ideology and
highlighting instances in which a minority opinion is embraced by the majority. As it pertains to
this work, an example of this shift can be found in the transition from Aguilar v. Felton (1985) to
Agostini v. Felton (1997). Analyzing the underpinnings of dissenting opinions may also provide
a deeper understanding of the ideological reference points that guide the majority.
5-4 Opinions
A bench spread of 5-4 was evidenced in six of the ten cases analyzed in this study.
Further research is needed to determine the factors contributing to Court opinions that consist of
a 5-4 majority. While 5-4 decisions are not uncommon, they signify a polarizing divide among
the justices. The demand for further research in this area reiterates the need for future exploration
of dissenting opinions. In addition to dissents, analysis of 5-4 opinions should also evaluate the
ideological divergence between the majority and any concurring opinions.
The Roberts Court
This work suggests future research on the era of the Roberts court would also be
beneficial. As mentioned above, in comparison to previous Courts, the Roberts Court has
frequently ruled in favor religion (Epstein & Posner, 2021). Analysis of the Roberts Court will
become increasingly more interesting as the administrative power of the Biden administration
takes root. Differences between administrative priorities of the president and ideology of the
Court may lead to an increase in executive orders.
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Positionality Revisited and Reflections
As an advocate for public education, I am sensitive to the potentially damaging
consequences highlighted by this work. In analysis of cases decided in favor of the petitioner, the
authors of the majority opinions frequently concentrated on making child-centered decisions. It
has become increasingly clear that the best interest of an individual may very well be at odds
with the needs of an organization. However, I maintain that a barrier between public funds and
parochial schools will wholly will greatly benefit the over 50 million students enrolled in United
States public schools (NCES, 2020). Further, the journey of conducting this research has led me
to reflect deeply on the contrast between the intent of Blaine Amendments upon inception and
their present-day utilization. Specifically, should a proposed federal amendment, fraught with
bigotry at birth, remain fixed in state constitutions of the 21st century? To address this concern
adequately, it is necessary to recall that not all Blaine Amendments were implemented in single
instance with the intent of erecting a barrier between public funds and Catholic schools. AntiCatholic sentiments are not representative of all ideologies contributing to the development of
state Blaine language. As a researcher, this work served as a reminder that the most boisterous
narrative rarely represents a broad range of viewpoints.
Conclusion
As the pendulum of church and state judicial ideology continues to swing, the Court must
be mindful that it does not cross the equilibrium delineating church and state. Recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions indicate a momentous shift towards accommodating religious
institutions. In recent years, this shift has been far from gradual and indicates that state
amendments barring religious institutions from receiving public aid, Blaine Amendments, may
be dismantled by the Court. The Court’s rejection of express discrimination in an attempt to

90

maintain strict separation signals endorsement of expanding the constitutional permissiveness of
publicly funding religious schools. In her dissenting opinion in Trinity, Justice Sotomayor
cautions against the deviation from strict separation by highlighting the significance of the
decisions made by America’s founders.
The course of this history shows that those who lived under the laws and practices that
formed religious establishments made a considered decision that civil government should
not fund ministers and their houses of worship. To us, their debates may seem abstract
and this history remote. That is only because we live in a society that has long benefited
from decisions made in response to these now centuries-old arguments, a society that
those not so fortunate fought hard to build. (Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 2017)

91

REFERENCES
4 Cong. Rec. 205 (1875).
Adams, N. A. (2012). Florida's blaine amendment: Goldilocks and the seperate but equal
doctrine. St.Thomas Law Review, 24(1), 1-31.
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
Alexander, K., & Alexander, M. D. (2019). American public school law. St. Paul: West
Academic Publishing.
Barclay, S. H., Earley, B., & Boone, A. (2019). Original meaning and the establishment clause:
corpus linguistics analysis. Arizona Law Review, 61(3), 505-560.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3295239 .
Beerworth, A. A. (2004). Religion in the marketplace: Establishments, pluralisms, and the
doctrinal eclipse of free exercise. Thomas Jefferson Law Review, 26(2), 333-408.
Bernard Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the city of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845).
Bertucio, B. (2020). The political theology of Justice Hugo Black. Journal of Law and Religion,
35(1), 79-101. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.10 .
Black, Jr, H. (1975). My father: a remembrance. New York, NY: Random House.
Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872).
Borders, M. A. (2018). The future of state blaine amendments in light of Trinity Lutheran:
Strengthening the nondiscriminatig argument. Notre Dame Law Review, 93(5), 21412168.

92

http://heinonline.org.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/tndl93&div=6
8.
Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. Qualitative Research
Journal, 9(2), 27-40. https://doi.org/10.3316/qrj0902027 .
Boyer, J. D. (2009). Education tax credits: School choice initiatives capable of surmounting
blaine amendments. Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, 43(1), 117-149. .
Burke, L. M., & Stepman, J. (2014). Breaking down blaine amendments’ indefensible barrier to
education choice. Journal of School Choice, 8(4), 637-654.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15582159.2014.973783.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Cardno, C. (2018). Policy document anlaysis: A practical educational leadership tool and
qualitative research method. Educational Administration: Theory and Practice, 24(4),
623-640. https://doi.org/10.14527/kuey.2018.016 .
Choper, J. H. (1968). The establishment clause and aid to parochial schools. California Law
review, 56(2), 260-341. https://doi.org/10.2307/3479291 .
Conklin, F. J., & Vache, J. M. (n.d.). The Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the
washington constitution-a proposal to the supreme court. University of Puget Sound Law
Review, 8, 411-460.
Cortman, D. (2017, January 28). Debate-State Blaine Amendments. Western Chapters
Conference. Simi Valley, California.
Davis, D. H. (2002). Mitchell V Helms and the modern cultural assult on separation of church
and state. Boston College Law Review, 43(5), 1035-1070.

93

DeForrest, M. E. (2003). An overview and evaluation of state Blaine Amendments: Origins,
scope, and First Amendment concerns. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 26(2),
551-626. .
Deverich, C. A. (2006). Establishment clause jurisprudence and the free exercise dilemma: A
structural unitary-accommodationist argument for the constitutionality of god in the
public square. Brigham Young University Law Review(1), 211-262.
Donahoe v. RIchards, 38 Me. 379 (1854).
Duncan, K. (2003). Secularism's laws: state Blaine Amendments and religious persecution.
Fordham Law Review, 72(3), 493-593.
Duncan, R. F. (2006). Locked out: Locke v. davey and the broken promise of equal access.
College of Law, Faculty Publications, 8(4), 699-723.
Epstein, L., & Posner, E. A. (2021). The roberts court and the transformation of constitutional
protections for religion: A statictical portrait. Supreme Court Review.
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 591 U.S. ___ (2020).
Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Fea, J. (2016). Was america founded as a christian nation? A historical introduction. Louisville,
Kentucky: Westminister John Knoz Press.
Feldman, N. (2002). The intelluctual origins of the Establishment Clause. New York University
Law Review(77), 346-428.
Flowers, R. B. (2005). That godless court? Louisville, Kentucky: Westminister John Knox Press.
Foundation, The Century. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://tcf.org/content/report/closing-americaseducation-funding/

94

Frey, B. (2018). The SAGE encyclopedia of educational research, measurement, and evaluation.
Thousand Oaks , CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.
Geier, B. A. (2020). Funding god's schools a legal analysis of appropriating public dollars to
parochial schools: Does michigan's latest legislation violate the separation of church and
state? Journal of Law & Education, 49(3), 285-338.
Genshaft, B. S. (2001). With history, all things are secular: The establishment caluse adn the use
of history. . Case Western Reserve Law Review, 52(2), 573-598.
Gerber, S. D. (2011). Justice for Clarence Thomas: An intelluctual history of justice THomas's
twenty years on the Supreme Court. 88, pp. 667-690.
Green, S. K. (1992). The Blaine Amendment reconsidered. The American Journal of Legal
History, 36(1), 38-69. https://doi.org/10.2307/845452 .
Green, S. K. (2008). The Insignificance of the Blaine Amendment. Brigham Youg University
Law Review, 2008(2), 295-333. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3742967 .
Green, S. K. (2012). The Bible, the school, and the constitution. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, Inc.
Gressman, E., & Carmella, A. C. (1996). The RFRA revision of the free exercise clause. Ohio
State Law Journal, 65, 65-143.
Hall, M. D. (2019). Did america have a christian foundong? Nashville, Tennessee: Nelson
Books.
Halstead, E. M. (2004). After zelman v. simmons-harris, school voucher programs can exclude
religious schools. Syracuse Law Review, 54(1), 147-192.
Hansen, M. (2020, October 18). U.S. Public Education Spending Statistics. Retrieved from
Education Data: https://educationdata.org/public-education-spending-statistics

95

Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (1989).
Jefferson, T. (1998). Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists: The Final Letter, as Sent. The
Library of Congress Information Bulletin, 57(7).
Jeffries, J. C., & Ryan, J. E. (2001). A political history of the Establishment Clause. Michigan
Law Review, 100(2), 279-370. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.267786 .
Katz, M. (2011). The state of Blaine: A closer look at the Blaine amendments and their modern
application. Engage, 12(1), 111-120.
Kauper, P. G. (1973). Everson v. board of education: product of the judicial will. Arizona law
Review, 15(2), 307-326.
Kemerer, F. R. (1997). State constitutions and school vouchers. Wests Education Law, 120(1).
Kemerer, F. R. (1998). The constitutinal dimension of school vouchers. Texas Forum on Civil
Liberties & Civil Rights, 3(2), 137-185.
Klinkhamer, M. C. (1956). The Blaine Amendment of 1875: Private motives for political action.
Catholic University of America Press, 42(1), 15-49.
Komer, R. D. (2018). Trinity Lutheran and the future of educational choice: Implications for
state blaine amendments. William Mitchell Law Review, 44(2), 551.
Lantta, L. A. (2004). The post-zelman voucher battle ground: Where to turn after federal
challenges to Blaine Amendments fail. Law and Contemporary Problems, 67(3), 213242.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). https://www.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1315.
Marion, D. E. (1997). The jurisprudence of justice william j. brennan, Jr: The law and politics of
'libertarian dignity.'. Lanham, Maryland: Roman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. .

96

Martell, J. A. (1977). School finance reform: Robinson v. Cahill. Urban Law Annual, 13(1), 139166.
Massaro, T. M. (2005). Religious freedom and accommodationist neutrality: non-neutral
critique. Oregon Law Review, 84(4), 935-1000.
McCarthy, M. (1981). Church and state: Separation or accomodation? Harvard Educational
Review, 51(3), 373-394.
McCarthy, M. (2009). Beyond the wall of seperation: Church-state concerns in public schools.
Phi Delta Kappan, 90(10), 714-719. https://doi.org/10.1177/003172170909001006 .
McConnell. (2003). Establishment and disestablishment at the founding, part i: Establishment of
religion. William and Mary Law Review, 44(5), 2105-2208.
McGreevy, J. T. (2003). Catholicism and American freedon: a history. New York, NY: W.W.
Norton & Company, Inc. .
McLellan, D. (1996). Biographical profile. William Mitchell Law Review, 22(1), pp. 3-6.
McMillan, K. R. (1998). The turning tide: The emerging fourth wave of school finance reform
litigation and the courts' lingering institutional concerns. Ohio State Law Journal, 58,
1867-1903.
Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). Caselaw. Retrieved Retrieved June 10, 2021, from
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/caselaw, from Merriam-Webster.com
dictionary.
Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). Funding. Retrieved Retrieved June 10, 2021, from
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fund, from Merriam-Webster.com
dictionary.

97

Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). Parochial. Retrieved Retrieved June 10, 2021, from
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/parochial, from Merriam-Webster.com
dictionary.
Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). Sociopolitical. Retrieved Retrieved June 9, 2021, from
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sociopolitical, from Merriam-Webster.com
dictionary.
Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). Retrieved Retrieved June 9, 2021, from https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/ideology, from Ideology. In Merriam-Webster.com dictionary.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
Morgan, I., & Amerikaner, A. (2018). Funding gaps: An analysis of school funding equity across
the u.s. and within each state. The Education Trust, pp. 1-13, .
Newman, R. (1997). Hugo Black: A biography. New York, New York: Fordham University
Press.
Overby, L. M., Henschen, B. M., Walsh, M. M., & Strauss, J. (n.d.). Courting constituents: An
analysis of the Senate confirmation vote on justice Clarance Thomas. The American
Political Science Review, 86(4), 997-1003.
Permuth, S., Mawdsley, R., & Silver, S. (2015). School law and research into the early twentyfirst century. In S. Permuth, R. Mawdsley, & S. Silver, Research methods for studying
legal issues in education. Cleveland, OH: Education Law Association.
Perry, B. A. (1989). Justice Hugo Black and the "wall of separation between church and state.".
Journal of Church and State, 31(1), 55-72.
Pomerance , B. (2019). The king in his high court: Chief justice John Roberts at the center.
Albany Law Review, 83(1), 169-238.

98

Pomerance, B. (2018). Center of order: Chief justice John Roberts and the coming struggle for a
respected Supreme Court. Albany Law Review, 82(2), 169-238.
President Grant's Desmoines address. (1897). The Annals of Iowa, 3(2), 138-139.
Ray, L. (2018). Reasonable action: reproductive rights, the free exercise cluase, and religious
freedom in the united states and the republic of ireland. St. John's Law Review, 92(1),
121-148.
Rehnquist, W. (1987). A tribute to chief justice warren e burger. Harvard Law Review, 100(5),
969-1001.
Rexine, J. E. (1987). The 350th anniversary of the boston latin school. The Classical Journal,
82(3), 236-241.
Riggs, R. E., & Proffitt, T. D. (1983). The judicial philosophy of justice rehnquist. Akron Law
review, 16(4), 555-604.
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
Russo, C. J., & Thro, W. E. (2017). Blessed Trinity: Implications of Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia v. Comer for religious liberty. Religion & Education, 44(3), 247-262.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15507394.2017.1358034.
San Antonio Independent Schoool District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. (1973).
Schmidt, C. W. (2014). The challenge fo the supreme court biography: The case of chief justice
rehnquist. Constitutional Commentary, 29(2), 271-292.
Schwartz, A. E. (2007). Dusting off the Blaine Amendment: Two challenges to Missouri's antiestablishment tradition. Missouri Law Review, 73(1), 339-386.
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal.3d 728 (1971).
Shapiro, D. L. (1976). Mr. justice rehnquist: preliminary view. 90(2), 293-357.

99

Sheff v. O'Neill et al., 238 Conn. 1 (1996).
Slater, J. S. (2004). Florida's Blaine Amendment and Its effect on educational opportunities.
Stetson Law Review, 33(2).
Sondergard, M. (2018). Blaines Beware: Trinity Lutheran and the changing landscape of state
no-funding provisions. The University of Kansas law Review, 66(4), 753-785.
Sughrue, J. (n.d.). The legal and historical links between public schools and the Establishment
Clause through the twentieth century. In S. Permuth, Religion and law in public schools.
(pp. 1-64). Cleveland: Education Law Association.
Sullivan, K. (2006). A tribute to justice sandra day o'connor. Harvard Law Review, 119(5),
1251-1256.
Swisher, J. A. (1925). Grant's Des Moines speech. The Palimpsest, 6(12), 409-421.
The Judiciary Act, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
Thro, W. E. (1994, May 1). Judicial analysis during the third wave of school finance litgation:
The Massachusets decision as a model. Boston College Law Review, 35(3), 597-616.
Tobias, C. (1996). Warren burger and the administration of justice. 41(2), 505-520.
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 582 U.S.__(2017).
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779 (2015).
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Pauley, 976 F.Supp.2d 1137 (2013).
Trump, D. J. (2017). Remarks by President Trump at the Faith and Freedom Coalitions Road to
Majority Conference. Washington, D.C.
U.S. Const. amend. I.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

100

Viteritti, J. P. (1998). Blaine's wake: school choice, the First Amendment, and state
constitutional law. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 21(3), 657-718.
Walker, J. B. (2007). A primer on governmental accomodation of religion. Journal of Church &
State, 49(3), 409-421 doi: 10.1093/jcs/49.3.409 .
Wermiel, S. J. (1998). Law and human dignity: The judicial soul of justice brennan. William &
Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 7(1), 223-240 doi: 10.4324/9781315053547-11 .
West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Wood, R. C., & Petko, M. C. (2000). Assessing agostini v. felton in light of lemon v. kurtzman:
The coming of age in the debate between religious affiliated aid and state schools.
Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal , 2000(1), 1-16.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).

101

APPENDICES

102

Appendix A: State Blaine Amendment Language

State

Alabama

Constitutional language
“No appropriation shall be made to any charitable or
educational institution not under the absolute control of the
state, other than normal schools established by law for the
professional training of teachers for the public schools of
the state, except by a vote of two-thirds of all the members
elected to each house.”

Citation
Alabama
Const. Art.
IV, § 73

“No money raised for the support of the public schools
shall be appropriated to or used for the support of any
sectarian or denominational school.”

Alabama
Const. Art.
XIV, § 263

Alaska

“The legislature shall by general law establish and maintain Alaska Const.
a system of public schools open to all children of the State, Art. VII, § 1
and may provide for other public educational institutions.
Schools and institutions so established shall be free from
sectarian control. No money shall be paid from public
funds for the direct benefit of any religious or other private
educational institution.”

Arizona

“No public money or property shall be appropriated for or
Arizona
applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or Const. Art. II,
to the support of any religious establishment.”
§ 12

Figure 1A
State Blaine Amendment Language
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State
California

Colorado

Constitutional language
“No public money shall ever be appropriated for the
support of any sectarian or denominational school, or any
school not under the exclusive control of the officers of the
public schools; nor shall any sectarian or denominational
doctrine be taught, or instruction thereon be permitted,
directly or indirectly, in any of the common schools of this
State.”

Citation
California
Const. Art.
IX, § 8

“Neither the Legislature, nor any county, city and county,
township, school district, or other municipal corporation,
shall ever make an appropriation, or pay from any public
fund whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of any
religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian purpose, or help
to support or sustain any school, college, university,
hospital, or other institution controlled by any religious
creed, church, or sectarian denomination whatever; nor
shall any grant or donation of personal property or real
estate ever be made by the state, or any city, city and
county, town, or other municipal corporation for any
religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose whatever;
provided, that nothing in this section shall prevent the
Legislature granting aid pursuant to Section 3 of Article
XVI.”

California
Const. Art.
XVI, § 5

“No appropriation shall be made for charitable, industrial,
educational or benevolent purposes to any person,
corporation or community not under the absolute control of
the state, nor to any denominational or sectarian institution
or association.”

“Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town,
township, school district or other public corporation, shall
ever make any appropriation, or pay from any public fund
or moneys whatever, anything in aid of any church
or sectarian society, or for any sectarian purpose, or to help
support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college,
university or other literary or scientific institution,
controlled by any church or sectarian denomination
whatsoever; nor shall any grant or donation of land, money
or other personal property, ever be made by the state, or
any such public corporation to any church, or for any
sectarian purpose.”
Figure 1A (Continued): State Blaine Amendment Language

Colorado
Const. Art. V,
§ 34

Colorado
Const. Art.
IX, § 7
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State
Delaware

Constitutional language
“No portion of any fund now existing, or which
may hereafter be appropriated, or raised by tax, for
educational purposes, shall be appropriated to, or used by,
or in aid of any sectarian, church or denominational school;
provided, that all real or personal property used for school
purposes, where the tuition is free, shall be exempt from
taxation and assessment for public purposes.”

Citation
Delaware
Const. Art X,
§3

Florida

“No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or
agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury
directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious
denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.”

Florida Const.
Art. I, § 3

Georgia

“No money shall ever be taken from the public treasury,
directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, cult,
or religious denomination or of any sectarian institution.”

Georgia
Const. Art. I,
§ II, ¶ VII

Hawaii

“The State shall provide for the establishment, support and
control of a statewide system of public schools free from
sectarian control … nor shall public funds be appropriated
for the support or benefit of any sectarian or nonsectarian
private educational institution, except that proceeds of
special purpose revenue bonds authorized or issued under
section 12 of Article VII may be appropriated to finance or
assist: 1. Not-for-profit corporations that provide early
childhood education and care facilities serving the general
public; and 2. Not-for-profit private non-sectarian and
sectarian elementary schools, secondary schools, colleges
and universities.”

Hawaii Const.
Art. X, § 1

Figure 1A (Continued): State Blaine Amendment Language

105

State
Idaho

Constitutional language
“Neither the legislature nor any county, city, town,
township, school district, or other public corporation, shall
ever make any appropriation, or pay from any public fund
or moneys whatever, anything in aid of any church or
sectarian or religious society, or for any sectarian or
religious purpose, or to help support or sustain any school,
academy, seminary, college, university or other literary or
scientific institution, controlled by any church, sectarian or
religious denomination whatsoever; nor shall any grant or
donation of land, money or other personal property ever
be made by the state, or any such public corporation, to any
church or for any sectarian or religious purpose; provided,
however, that a health facilities authority, as specifically
authorized and empowered by law, may finance or
refinance any private, not for profit, health facilities owned
or operated by any church or sectarian religious society,
through loans, leases, or other transactions.”

Citation
Idaho Const.
Art. IX, § 5

Illinois

“Neither the General Assembly nor any county, city, town,
township, school district, or other public corporation, shall
ever make any appropriation or pay from any public fund
whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian
purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy,
seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific
institution, controlled by any church or sectarian
denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of
land, money, or other personal property ever be made by
the State, or any such public corporation, to any church, or
for any sectarian purpose.”

Illinois Const.
Art. X, § 3

Indiana

“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the
benefit of any religious or theological institution.”

Indiana
Const. Art. 1,
§6

Kansas

“No religious sect or sects shall control any part of the
public educational funds.”

Kansas Const.
Art. 6, § 6(c)

Kentucky

“No portion of any fund or tax now existing, or that may
hereafter be raised or levied for educational purposes, shall
be appropriated to, or used by, or in aid of, any church,
sectarian or denominational school.”

Kentucky
Const. § 189

Figure 1A (Continued): State Blaine Amendment Language
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State
Maryland

Constitutional language
“The General Assembly, at its First Session after the
adoption of this Constitution, shall by Law establish
throughout the State a thorough and efficient System of
Free Public Schools; and shall provide by taxation, or
otherwise, for their maintenance.” Maryland Const. Art.
VIII, § 1. “The School Fund of the State shall be kept
inviolate, and appropriated only to the purposes of
Education.”

Citation
Maryland
Const. Art.
VIII, § 3

Massachusetts

No grant, appropriation or use of public money or property
or loan of credit shall be made or authorized by the
Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof for the
purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any infirmary,
hospital, institution, primary or secondary school, or
charitable or religious undertaking which is not publicly
owned and under the exclusive control, order and
supervision of public officers or public agents authorized
by the Commonwealth or federal authority or both … and
no such grant, appropriation or use of public money or
property or loan of public credit shall be made or
authorized for the purpose of founding, maintaining or
aiding any church, religious denomination or society.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the
Commonwealth from making grants-in-aid to private
higher educational institution or to students or parents or
guardians of students attending such institutions

Massachusetts
Const.
Amend. Art.
XVIII, § 2

Michigan

No money shall be appropriated or drawn from the treasury
for the benefit of any religious sect or society, theological
or religious seminary; nor shall property belonging to the
state be appropriated for any such purpose.

Michigan
Const. Art. I,
§4

No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid
or any public credit utilized, by the legislature or any other
political subdivision or agency of the state directly or
indirectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or
other non-public, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary
school. No payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption or
deductions, tuition voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public
monies or property shall be provided, directly or indirectly,
to support the attendance of any student or the employment
of any person at any such nonpublic school or at any
location or institution where instruction is offered in whole
or in part to such nonpublic school students ….
Figure 1A (Continued): State Blaine Amendment Language

Michigan
Const. Art.
VIII, § 2
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State
Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

Constitutional language
[N]or shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the
benefit of any religious societies or religious or theological
seminaries.

Citation
Minnesota
Const. Art. I,
§ 16

In no case shall any public money or property be
appropriated or used for the support of schools wherein the
distinctive doctrines, creeds or tenets of any particular
Christian or other religious sect are promulgated or taught.

Minnesota
Const. Art.
XIII, § 2

No religious or other sect or sects shall ever control any
part of the school or other educational funds of this state;
nor shall any funds be appropriated toward the support of
any sectarian school, or to any school that at the time of
receiving such appropriation is not conducted as a free
school.

Mississippi
Const. Art.
VIII, § 208

That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury,
directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or
denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher,
minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference
shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any
church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious
faith or worship.

Missouri
Const. Art. I,
§7

Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town,
township, school district or other municipal corporation,
shall ever make an appropriation or pay from any public
fund whatever, anything in aid of any religious creed,
church or sectarian purpose, or to help to support or sustain
any private or public school, academy, seminary, college,
university, or other institution of learning controlled by any
religious creed, church or sectarian denomination
whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of personal
property or real estate ever be made by the state, or any
county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, for any
religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose whatever.

Missouri
Const. Art.
IX, § 8

Figure 1A (Continued): State Blaine Amendment Language
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State
Montana

Constitutional language
The legislature, counties, cities, towns, school districts, and
public corporations shall not make any direct or indirect
appropriation or payment from any public fund or monies,
or any grant of lands or other property for any sectarian
purpose or to aid any church, school, academy, seminary,
college, university, or other literary or scientific institution,
controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or
denomination. (2) This section shall not apply to funds
from federal sources provided to the state for the express
purpose of distribution to non-public education.

Citation
Montana
Const. Art. X,
§6

Nebraska

Notwithstanding any other provision in the Constitution,
appropriation of public funds shall not be made to any
school or institution of learning not owned or exclusively
controlled by the state or a political subdivision thereof;
Provided, that the Legislature may provide that the state or
any political subdivision thereof may contract with
institutions not wholly owned or controlled by the state or
any political subdivision to provide for educational or other
services for the benefit of children under the age of twentyone years who are handicapped, as that term is from time to
time defined by the Legislature, if such services are
nonsectarian in nature

Nebraska
Const. Art.
VII, § 11

No public funds of any kind or character whatever, State,
County or Municipal, shall be used for sectarian purpose
[sic].

Nevada
Const. Art.
11, § 10

Nevada

New Hampshire Provided, nevertheless, that no money raised by taxation
shall ever be granted or applied for the use of the schools or
institutions of any religious sect or denomination.

New
Hampshire
Const. Pt.
SECOND,
Art. 83

Figure 1A (Continued): State Blaine Amendment Language
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State
New Mexico

New York

North Dakota

Constitutional language
[N]o part of the proceeds arising from the sale or disposal
of any lands granted to the state by congress, or any other
funds appropriated, levied or collected for educational
purposes, shall be used for the support of any sectarian,
denominational or private school, college or university.

Citation
New Mexico
Const. Art.
XII, § 3

Provision shall be made for the establishment and
maintenance of a system of public schools which shall be
open to all the children of the state and free from sectarian
control, and said schools shall always be conducted in
English.
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof, shall use its
property or credit or any public money, or authorize or
permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or
maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of
any school or institution of learning wholly or in part under
the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in
which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught, but
the legislature may provide for the transportation of
children to and from any school or institution of learning.

New Mexico
Const. Art.
XXI, § 4
New York
Const. Art XI,
§3

A high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and
morality on the part of every voter in a government by the
people being necessary in order to ensure the continuance
of that government and the prosperity and happiness of the
people, the legislative assembly shall make provision for
the establishment and maintenance of a system of public
schools which shall be open to all children of the state of
North Dakota and free from sectarian control. This
legislative requirement shall be irrevocable without the
consent of the United States and the people of North
Dakota.

North Dakota
Const. Art
VIII, § 1

The legislative assembly shall provide for a uniform system
of free public schools throughout the state, beginning with
the primary and extending through all grades up to and
including schools of higher education, except that the
legislative assembly may authorize tuition, fees and service
charges to assist in the financing of public schools of
higher education.

North Dakota
Const. Art
VIII, § 2

Figure 1A (Continued): State Blaine Amendment Language
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State
Oklahoma

Constitutional language
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,
applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or
system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or
dignitary, or sectarian institution as such.

Citation
Oklahoma
Const. Art. II,
§5

Oregon

No money shall be drawn from the Treasury for the benefit
of any religeous [sic], or theological institution, nor shall
any money be appropriated for the payment of
any religeous [sic] services in either house of the
Legislative Assembly.

Oregon
Const. Art. I,
§5

Pennsylvania

No money raised for the support of the public schools of
the Commonwealth shall be appropriated to or used for the
support of any sectarian school.

Pennsylvania
Const. Art. 3,
§ 15

South Carolina

No money shall be paid from public funds nor shall the
credit of the State or any of its political subdivisions be
used for the direct benefit of any religious or other private
educational institution.

South
Carolina
Const. Ann.
Art. XI, § 4

South Dakota

No money or property of the state shall be given or
appropriated for the benefit of any sectarian or religious
society or institution.” South Dakota Const. Art. VI, § 3.
“No appropriation of lands, money or other property or
credits to aid any sectarian school shall ever be made by
the state, or any county or municipality within the state, nor
shall the state or any county or municipality within the state
accept any grant, conveyance, gift or bequest of lands,
money or other property to be used for sectarian purposes,
and no sectarian instruction shall be allowed in any school
or institution aided or supported by the state.

South Dakota
Const. Art.
VIII, § 16

Texas

No money shall be appropriated, or drawn from the
Treasury for the benefit of any sect, or religious society,
theological or religious seminary; nor shall property
belonging to the State be appropriated for any such
purposes.” Texas Const. Art. I, § 7. “The permanent school
fund and the available school fund may not be appropriated
to or used for the support of any sectarian school.

Texas Const.
Art. VII, §
5(c)

Figure 1A (Continued): State Blaine Amendment Language
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State
Utah

Constitutional language
No public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or
for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment.
Neither the state of Utah nor its political subdivisions may
make any appropriation for the direct support of any school
or educational institution controlled by any religious
organization

Citation
Utah Const.
Art. I, § 4.

Utah Const.
Art. X, § 9

Vermont

And that no person ought to, or of right can be compelled
to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any
place of worship, or maintain any minister, contrary to the
dictates of conscience .…

Vermont
Const. Ch. I,
Art. 3

Virginia

The General Assembly shall not make any appropriation of
public funds, personal property, or real estate to any church
or sectarian society, or any association or institution of any
kind whatever which is entirely or partly, directly or
indirectly, controlled by any church or sectarian society .…

Virginia
Const. Art.
IV, § 16

Washington

No public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or
the support of any religious establishment .…

Washington
Const. Art. I,
§ 11

All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by
the public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control
or influence.

Washington
Const. Art.
IX, § 4

Wisconsin

[N]or shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the
benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological
seminaries.

Wisconsin
Const. Art. I,
§ 18

Wyoming

No money of the state shall ever be given or appropriated
to any sectarian or religious society or institution.

Wyoming
Const. Art. 1,
§ 19

No appropriation shall be made for charitable, industrial,
educational or benevolent purposes to any person,
corporation or community not under the absolute control of
the state, nor to any denominational or sectarian institution
or association.

Wyoming
Const. Art. 3,
§ 36
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